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  Abstract:	  Despite	  the	  stern	  admonishments	  of	  the	  prominent	  Extractive	  Industry	  Review	  
in	  2003,	  the	  World	  Bank	  Group	  (WBG)	  has	  continued	  to	  promote	  the	  expansion	  of	  mining	  
activities	   in	   resource	   rich	   client-­countries.	   While	   keeping	   in	   line	   with	   its	   traditional	  
mantra	   on	   the	   economic	   benefits	   of	   the	   sector	   in	   cash-­strapped	   countries,	   poverty	  
reduction	  and	  environmental	  sustainability	  have	  become	  in	  recent	  years,	   the	  new	  porte-­
étandard	  to	  justify	  the	  need	  for	  the	  WBG	  to	  remain	  actively	  involved	  in	  the	  sector.	  Building	  
on	   the	   cases	   of	   the	  Philippines,	   Papua	  New	  Guinea	  and	  Lao	  PDR,	   three	   of	  Asia’s	   richest	  
countries	   in	   term	   of	   mineral	   endowment,	   this	   paper	   analyses	   this	   new	   social	   and	  
environmental	  narrative	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  highly	  political	  nature	  of	  the	  role	  played	  
by	  the	  WBG	  in	  the	  mining	  sector	  of	  its	  country-­clients	  over	  time.	  The	  cases	  suggest	  that	  the	  
WBG	  has	  played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  influencing	  a	  wave	  of	  new	  mining	  regimes	  in	  the	  region.	  It	  is	  
argued	   that	   these	   new	   regimes,	  which	   comprises	  multilateral	   social	   and	   environmental	  
safeguards,	   circumscribes	   the	   risks	   faced	   by	   industry,	   rather	   than	   by	   local	   populations.	  
While	   successful	   in	   stimulating	   foreign	   direct	   investments	   in	   the	   sector,	   these	   regimes	  
might	  also	  prove	  to	  be	  ineffective	  in	  taming	  local	  and	  national	  resentment	  against	  mining	  
activities.	  Crucially,	  the	  engineering	  of	  mining	  regimes	  and	  norm-­settings	  in	  multilateral	  
arenas	  brings	  forth	  concerns	  relating	  to	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  transformations	  of	  the	  roles	  
and	   responsibilities	   assigned	   to	   local	   mining	   stakeholders,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   possible	  
subsequent	  contraction	  of	  local	  political	  spaces.	  	  
	  
	  
Introduction	  	   	  
	   Under	  the	  leadership	  of	  public	  organisations,	  the	  drive	  to	  build	  new	  markets	  in	  Asia	  
has	   been	   yielding	   new	   approaches,	   which	   have	   come	   to	   shape	   institutions	   and	   engage	  
social	   actors.	   The	   core	   objective	   of	   these	   approaches	   has	   been	   to	   mitigate	   risk	   for	  
mobilising	  capital	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  facilitating	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  private	  sector.	  These	  
initiatives	   have	   been	   twined	   with	   the	   drive	   to	   create	   a	   market	   society,	   which	   notably	  
demands	   the	   adoption	   of	   regulatory	   consistency	  and	   the	   extension	   of	   market	   discipline	  
well	   beyond	   the	   private	   sector.	   This	   has	   been	   particularly	   true	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   recent	  
drive	   to	   expand	   large-­‐scale	  mining	   activities	   in	   Asia,	   a	   drive	  which	   has	   been	   led	   by	   the	  
World	  Bank	  Group	  (WBG).	  
As	  mining	   is	  considered	   to	  be	  a	  uniquely	  high-­‐risk	  enterprise,	   the	  overall	   framework	  
promoted	  by	  the	  World	  Bank	  in	  the	  sector	  has	  been	  specifically	  geared	  towards	  rewarding	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investors	  with	  tax	  breaks	  and	  other	  incentives.	  However,	  in	  recent	  years,	  such	  efforts	  have	  
been	  met	  with	  severe	  criticism	  linked	  to	  the	  significant	  social	  and	  environmental	  costs	  of	  
mining	  activities,	  not	  withstanding	  the	  political	  instability,	  corruption	  and	  violent	  conflicts	  
they	   have	   often	   brought	   forth.	   Of	   particular	   interest	   to	   this	   contribution,	   is	   the	   recent	  
addition	  of	  a	   strong	  social-­‐development	  narrative	  attached	   to	   the	  multilateral	  guidelines,	  
one	   that	   emphasises	   transparency	   and	   governance,	   local	   communities	   involvement	   in	  
participatory	  schemes	  and	  overall,	  a	  pro-­‐poor	  economic	  growth.	  
Three	  specific	  countries	  have	  been	  selected	  to	  map	  the	  role	  played	  by	  the	  World	  Bank	  
Group	  in	  fostering	  new	  mining	  regimes	  in	  Asia:	  the	  Philippines,	  Papua	  New	  Guinea	  (PNG)	  
and	  the	  Lao	  People’s	  Democratic	  Republic	  (Laos).	  Each	  of	  these	  resource-­‐rich	  countries	  has	  
in	   recent	   years,	   reformed	   its	   mining	   regime	   under	   the	   distinct	   leadership	   of	   the	  World	  
Bank,	   twining	   pro-­‐mining	   investment	   incentives	   with	   a	   pro-­‐poor	   and	   environmentally	  
sustainable	  narrative.	  
Building	   on	   a	   critical	   political-­‐economy	   framework,	   it	   will	   be	   argued	   that	   such	   dual	  
provisions	  embedded	  in	  the	  new	  regimes	  have	  been	  carrying	  a	  particular	  politic	  of	  mining,	  
one	   that	  has	  been	   transforming	   the	   very	   functions,	   responsibilities	   and	   legitimacy	  of	   the	  
stakeholders	   involved	   in	   the	  mining	  activities.	   It	  will	   be	  observed	   that	  not	  only	  does	   the	  
model	   advocate	   for	   the	   technocratic	   management	   of	   political	   demands,	   but	   for	   the	  
relocation	   of	   such	  management	   to	   be	   nestled	  within	   the	   local	   sphere	   rather	   than	   at	   the	  
national	   level.	  Crucially,	   frame	  within	  an	   issue	  of	   legitimacy,	   such	   techno-­‐management	  of	  
political	   demands	   runs	   the	   risk	   of	   exacerbating	   existing	   tensions	   on	   the	   ground,	   and	   in	  
turn,	  directly	  undermining	  the	  sector’s	  hopes	  for	  stability.	  
This	  paper	   is	  divided	  into	  three	  parts.	   In	  the	  first	  section,	   the	  overarching	  role	  of	   the	  
WBG	   in	   fostering	  new	  mining	   regimes	   in	   the	  Global	   South	   is	   analysed.	  Here	   the	   analysis	  
specifically	  underlines	  the	  new	  regulatory	  provisions	  embedded	  in	  the	  regimes	  which	  are	  
geared	  towards	  reducing	  economic	  and	  political	  risk	  faced	  by	  investors	  in	  the	  industry.	  In	  
the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  paper	  Asia,	  the	  cases	  of	  the	  Philippines,	  PNG	  and	  Laos	  are	  analysed.	  
Lastly,	   the	   paper	   investigates	   how	   the	   reforms	   have	   been	   transforming	   the	   roles	   of	   the	  
stakeholders	  involved	  in	  mining	  activities.	  It	  will	  be	  argued	  that	  in	  addition	  to	  constricting	  
the	   political	   arenas	   of	   civil	   society	   stakeholders,	   the	   new	   mining	   regime	   appears	   to	   be	  
riddled	  with	   contradictory	  objectives	  and	   therefore	   runs	   the	   risk	  of	   further	  exacerbating	  
tensions	  on	  the	  ground.	  	  
I.	  	  	  THE	  WORLD	  BANK	  &	  THE	  PROMOTION	  OF	  NEW	  MINING	  REGIMES:	  A	  FRAMEWORK 
	   The	  World	  Bank’s	  overarching	  influence	  over	  the	  liberalisation	  and	  deregulation	  of	  
the	  mining	  sector	  of	  poor	  indebted	  countries	  throughout	  the	  1980s	  and	  the	  1990s	  has	  been	  
sizeable.	   The	   Extractive	   Industries	   Review	   (EIR),	   which	   was	   established	   in	   2001	   to	  
independently	   evaluate	   the	   WBG’s	   involvement	   in	   extractive	   industries,	   estimated	   that	  
under	  the	  distinct	  leadership	  of	  the	  Bank,	  no	  less	  than	  100	  countries	  reformed	  their	  laws,	  
policies	   and	   institutions	   during	   the	   1990s	   (2003b:	   10).	   The	  EIR	   further	   stressed	   that	   ‘in	  
line	  with	  WBG	  advice’,	  these	  new	  legislations,	  designed	  to	  ensure	  the	  protection	  of	  capital	  
and	  to	  promote	  investment,	  successfully	  brought	  many	  developing	  countries	  to	  experience	  
an	  investment	  boom	  in	  their	  mining,	  oil,	  and	  gas	  sectors	  (2003b:	  13).	  
In	  her	  extensive	  analysis	  of	   the	  World	  Bank’s	   influence	  over	  African	  mining	  regimes,	  
Campbell	  (2004)	  catalogues	  three	  generations	  of	  mining	  codes,	  which	  followed	  the	  Bank’s	  
evolving	  guidelines	  over	  the	  better	  part	  of	  the	  last	  three	  decades.	  The	  first	  wave	  of	  reform,	  
which	  was	   carried	   out	   under	   the	   umbrella	   of	   the	   structural	   adjustment	   programs	   in	   the	  
1980s,	  saw	  a	  dramatic	  retreat	  of	  the	  State	  from	  the	  sector.	  However,	  by	  the	  early	  1990s,	  it	  
became	  clear	  that	  the	  promises	  of	  the	  reforms	  of	  the	  mining	  sector	  were	  not	  materialising	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as	  hoped.	  Oblivious	   to	   the	  decline	   in	   the	  demand	   for	  mineral	  resources	   in	   the	  1980s,	   the	  
Bank’s	   re-­‐assessment	   of	   the	   sector	   led	   to	   a	   new	   wave	   of	   liberalisation	   of	   the	   mining	  
regimes,	  what	  Campbell	  (2004)	  coined	  as	  the	  ‘second	  generation’	  of	  mining	  codes.	  	  
Mining	   in	   itself	   is	   considered	   to	   be	   a	   uniquely	   high-­‐risk	   enterprise:	   it	   is	   particularly	  
capital-­‐intensive,	  the	  period	  between	  investment	  and	  returns	  is	  often	  extensive,	  and	  profits	  
are	   subjected	   to	   the	   whims	   of	   commodity	   prices,	   notwithstanding	   the	   uncertainties	   of	  
geological	  exploration	  and	  reserve	  depletion	  rates.	  In	  addition,	  the	  industry	  is	  considered	  
to	   be	   subject	   of	   heightened	   risks	   in	   light	   of	   the	   ‘obsolescing	   bargain’	   effect,	   whereby	  
extractive	   industries	   become	   ‘hostages’	   in	   host	   countries.	   This	   is	   characterised	   by	   the	  
understanding	   that	   ‘once	   the	   companies	   have	   paid	   for	   multi-­‐million-­‐dollar	   fixed	   assets,	  
they	   cannot	   lightly	   withdraw	   from	   the	   host	   country’	   (Bray,	   2003:	   292).	   In	   light	   of	   such	  
risks,	   the	   economic	   rationale	   promoted	   by	   the	   Bank	   stipulates	   that	   countries	  must	   offer	  
highly	   competitive	   settings	   to	   draw	   the	   scarcely	   available	   capital	   in	   their	   own	   mining	  
sector.	   Combined	   with	   the	   overall	   stability	   of	   the	   governance	   regime	   offered	   by	   host	  
countries,	  the	  taxation	  regime	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  particularly	  important	  determinant	  of	  
returns	  to	  investors	  (World	  Bank,	  2005:	  117).	  As	  such,	  resource-­‐rich	  countries	  have	  been	  
encouraged	   to	   adopt	   fiscal	   regimes	   that	   were	   described	   as	   providing	   very	   generous	  
incentives	   to	   investors.	   Consequently,	   the	   1990s	  witnessed	   a	   new	  wave	   of	   liberalisation	  
reforms	  that	  sought	  to	  ultimately	  deliver	  the	  mining	  sector	  to	  Foreign	  Direct	  Investments	  
(FDI).	  
It	  is	  to	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  Bank’s	  influence	  in	  fostering	  ‘risk’	  investment	  has	  been	  multi-­‐
front.	   In	   addition	   to	   the	   Bank’s2	   historical	   role	   in	   fostering	   new	   mining	   codes,	   the	  
Multilateral	   Investment	   Guarantee	   Agency	   (MIGA)	   and	   the	   International	   Financial	  
Corporation	   (IFC)	   have	   played	   important	   complementary	   roles	   in	   opening	   new	  markets,	  
especially	  in	  mining.	  While	  IFC	  focuses	  on	  attracting	  private	  sector	  investment,	  particularly	  
in	  countries	  where	  its	  projects	  are	  expected	  to	  catalyse	  new	  investments,	  MIGA	  specialises	  
in	  providing	  political	  risk	  guarantees.	  However,	  MIGA	  and	  IFC’s	  influence	  in	  the	  extractive	  
industry	   extends	   far	   beyond	   the	   mere	   numbers	   of	   their	   respective	   portfolios.	   What	   is	  
indeed	  crucial	   to	  note	   is	   that	   the	  extent	  of	   the	  Bank’s	  affiliates	   influence	  over	   the	  mining	  
industry	   is	  better	  defined	  by	   their	   respective	  ability	   to	  act	   as	   catalysts	   for	  private	   sector	  
investments	   in	   countries	   and	   sectors	   that	   pose	   heightened	   ‘risk’3	   to	   investors.	   Foreign	  
investors	  often	  hesitate	  to	  invest	  in	  countries	  with	  weak	  governance.	  As	  such,	  the	  Group’s	  
power	  to	  galvanise	  investments	  in	  risk	  countries	  is	  overwhelming,	  notably	  in	  the	  extractive	  
industry	  which	  is	  specifically	  defined	  as	  a	  high-­‐risk	  sector.	  	  
While	  the	  second	  generation	  of	  mining	  codes	  promoted	  by	  the	  Bank	  did	  acknowledge	  
that	   a	   certain	   degree	   of	   regulation	   was	   necessary,	   notably	   in	   terms	   of	   environmental	  
protection,	   it	   is	   within	   the	   last	   decade	   that	   the	   ultimate	   need	   for	   the	   State	   to	   play	   a	  
regulatory	   role	   was	   acknowledged,	   thus	   a	   recent	   wave	   of	   ‘third	   generation’	   of	   mining	  
codes4	   (Campbell,	   2004).	   The	   recent	   drive	   to	   foster	   investments	   in	   mining	   has	   been	  
coloured	  by	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘risk’	  to	  the	  socio-­‐environmental	  and	  political	  
realms.	   Such	   shift,	   which	   characterised	   the	   third	   generation	   of	   mining	   codes,	   was	  
undoubtedly	   compelled	   by	   the	   increasing	   scrutiny	   the	   media	   and	   international	   Non-­‐
governmental	   Organisation	   (NGO)	   coalitions	   were	   exercising	   on	   the	   WBG’s	   activities.	  
Beyond	  the	  advisory	  work	  played	  by	  the	  World	  Bank,	  the	  institution’s	  sisters,	  MIGA	  and	  the	  
                                                
2 Hereafter, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development 
Association (IDA) are referred to as ‘the World Bank’ or ‘the Bank’. 
3 For example, since its inception MIGA has issued a total of $11billion in coverage while it further facilitated an 
estimated US$47 billion of FDI (Bray, 2003: 324). 
4 See Hatcher (2004) for an analysis of the Malian mining sector as an example of a third-generation mining code. 
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IFC,	   were	   throughout	   the	   1990s	   the	   objects	   of	   reputational	   blows	   linked	   to	   their	  
participation	  in	  contentious	  mining	  projects5.	  	  
Today,	   mining	   is	   understood	   to	   be	   one	   of	   the	   most	   environmentally	   disruptive	  
activities	   that	   can	   be	   undertaken	   by	   business	   (Bebbington	   et	   al.,	   2009:	   893)	   and	   the	  
concept	  of	  the	  ‘resource	  curse’	  is	  widely	  acknowledged	  by	  all	  stakeholders	  in	  the	  industry6.	  
The	  WBG	  is	  no	  exception:	  ‘resource-­‐rich	  countries	  are	  indeed	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  problems	  
achieving	   important	   development	   goals’,	   stated	   the	   Bank	   in	   a	   recent	   evaluation	   of	   its	  
experience	   in	  extractive	   industries	   (OEG,	  2005:	  120).	   In	   terms	  of	  environmental	   impacts,	  
large-­‐scale	  mining	  projects	  notably	  bring	  forth	  risks	  of:	  the	  destruction	  of	  natural	  habitats	  
as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   dumping	   of	   tailings	   and	   discharges;	   soil	   degradation	   and	   acid	   mine	  
drainage;	  riverbed	  pollution;	  chemical	  soil	  contamination;	  air	  emissions;	  the	  use	  of	  scarce	  
water	  and	  energy	  resources;	  workers	  handling	  chemical	  products;	  and	  the	  different	  risks	  
associated	  with	  exposure	  to	  toxic	  substances	  (Belem,	  2008:	  121).	  The	  mining	  industry	  is	  all	  
the	  more	  problematic	  as	  its	  environmental	  implications	  extend	  well	  beyond	  the	  duration	  of	  
the	  mine’s	  activity,	  as	  illustrated	  by	  the	  Filipino	  legacy	  of	  800	  abandoned	  mines	  (Goodland	  
and	   Wicks,	   2009:	   3).	   In	   addition	   to	   such	   environmental	   risks,	   it	   is	   further	   increasingly	  
understood	   that	   communities	   living	   in	   the	   vicinity	   of	   a	   mining	   site	   often	   bear	   an	  
overwhelming	   share	   of	   the	   negative	   impacts	   of	   the	   extractive	   industry.	   Belem	   further	  
found	   that	  mining	   projects	   tend	   to	   exacerbate	   income	   disparities	   and	   directly	   affect	   the	  
local	   community	   through:	   population	   displacement;	   increased	  migration	   of	  workers	   into	  
the	   project	   zone;	   price	   inflation	   resulting	   from	   this	   migration;	   the	   abandonment	   of	  
agricultural	  activities;	  expropriation	  of	  fertile	  land	  to	  satisfy	  the	  mine’s	  requirements;	  and	  
increased	  public	  health	  problems	  (2009:	  122).	  Such	  inherent	  social	  problems	  brought	  forth	  
by	   the	  mining	   industry	   are	   often	   exacerbated	   in	   countries	   where	   conflicts	   have	   already	  
erupted	  and	  where	  corruption	  is	  rampant.	  	  
It	   is	   in	   light	   of	   the	   extent	   of	   the	   social	   and	   environmental	   problems	   linked	   to	   the	  
extractive	  industry	  that	  James	  D.	  Wolfensohn,	  the	  President	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  at	  the	  time,	  
ordered	   two-­‐year	   moratorium	   on	   the	   WBG’s	   mining	   investments	   and	   a	   review	   of	   its	  
involvement	  in	  the	  industry.	  While	  the	  EIR,	  which	  emerged	  from	  this	  process,	  did	  conclude	  
that	  there	  was	  still	  a	  role	  for	  the	  WBG	  in	  the	  sector,	  it	  however	  underlined	  that	  such	  a	  role	  
should	  be	  strictly	   limited	  to	  one	  of	  contributing	   to	  sustainable	  development	  (EIR,	  2003b:	  
4).	  	  
In	   its	   official	   response	   to	   the	   EIR7	   (in	   2004),	   the	   Bank	   declared:	   ‘Our	   future	  
investments	   in	   extractive	   industries	  will	   be	   selective,	  with	   greater	   focus	   on	   the	  needs	   of	  
poor	   people,	   and	   a	   stronger	   emphasis	   on	   good	   governance	   and	   on	   promoting	  
environmentally	   and	   socially	   sustainable	   development’	   (2004:	   iii).	   While	   the	   Bank	  
acknowledged	   that	   extractive	   industries	  may	   ‘aggravate	   or	   cause	   serious	   environmental,	  
                                                
5 Amongst the better-known cases is the incident in 2000 at the Yanacocha mine in Peru. A truck from the mine, 
which is one of the most lucrative investments in the entire IFC portfolio (Beddington et al., 2008: 8996), spilled 
150 kilograms of mercury on a road. On another continent, in May 1998, the Kumtor gold mine in Kyrgyztan, 
which is financed and insured by IFC and MIGA, released nearly two tons of sodium cyanide into the Barskoon 
River (EIR, 2003b: 26). The controversial Freeport company, the operator of a copper and gold mine in New Guinea 
which was insured by MIGA, dumped 120,000 tonnes of toxic mining waste into a local river (BIC et al., 2006: 4). 
On the specific roles of the IFC and MIGA in the industry notably see Hatcher (2010). 
6 The ‘resource curse’ suggests that an abundance of natural resources creates political and economic distortions, 
which increase the likelihood that countries will experience negative development outcomes (Rosser, 2006: 7). The 
EIR found that while extractive industries can yield benefits for countries, data suggests that developing countries 
with few natural resources grew two to three times faster than resource-rich countries from 1960 to 2000 (EIR, 
2003b: 12). The Review further observed that the majority of the 45 countries that did not manage to sustain 
economic growth during that time also experienced violent conflict and civil strife in the 1990s (2003b: 12). 
7 For a thorough analysis of the EIR and the World Bank response, see Campbell (2009). 
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health,	  and	  social	  problems,	  including	  conflict	  and	  war’	  (World	  Bank	  2005:	  1),	  it	  however	  
remains	  adamant	  that	  such	  negative	  impacts	  are	  not	  inevitable.	  It	  repeatedly	  stated	  that	  it	  
is	  precisely	   in	   light	  of	   these	  particular	   risks	   that	   it	   should	   remain	   involved	   in	   the	   sector.	  
The	   WBG	   further	   argues	   that	   it	   brings	   safeguard	   policies	   and	   guidelines	   to	   the	   sector,	  
which	  ‘improves	  projects	  beyond	  compliance’	  (OEG,	  2005:	  118).	  	  
It	   is	   to	   be	   noted	   that	   this	   greater	   emphasis	   on	   the	   environmental	   and	   social	  
consequences	   of	   mining	   activities	   is	   part	   of	   a	   greater	   shift	   within	   the	   Bank	   as	   a	   whole.	  
While	   the	   specifics	   of	   the	   changes	   carried	   out	   within	   the	   Bank	   amidst	   the	   Wolfensohn	  
presidency	  (1995-­‐2005)	  are	  beyond	  the	  range	  of	  this	  contribution,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  
the	  period	  marked	  an	  all-­‐encompassing	  shift	  within	  the	  Bank’s	  narrative.	  From	  its	  austere	  
emphasis	  on	  the	  blind	  pursuit	  of	  economic	  growth,	  which	  characterised	  the	  1980s	  and	  the	  
better	  part	  of	  the	  1990s,	  the	  Bank	  embraced	  in	  the	  last	  decade	  a	  more	  ‘comprehensive’	  way	  
of	  doing	  business8.	  ‘Our	  dream	  is	  a	  world	  free	  of	  poverty’,	  Wolfensohn	  declared,	  and	  in	  so	  
doing,	  he	  committed	  the	  institution,	  at	  least	  discursively,	  to	  addressing	  the	  social	  aspects	  of	  
poverty	   and	   to	   forging	   closer	   partnerships	   with	   other	   actors	   in	   development,	   including	  
those	  within	  civil	  society9.	  	  
It	  is	  a	  fact	  that	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1990s,	  the	  Bank	  had	  substituted	  its	  conventional	  policy	  
recommendation	   framework	   for	  one	   that	  promoted	   far	   stricter	  environmental	   and	  social	  
standards.	  The	  birth	  of	  what	  is	  here	  referred	  to	  as	  the	   ‘Social-­‐Development	  Model’	  (SDM)	  
echoed	   throughout	   the	  mining	   industry	   and	  within	   regulatory	   regimes	   across	   the	  Global	  
South.	  This	  shift	  encompasses	  the	  unwavering	  emphasis	  on	  ‘poverty	  reduction’	  as	  a	  central	  
objective	  of	  all	  the	  Bank’s	  actions	  within	  the	  sector,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  novel	  emphasis	  on	  social	  
and	  environmental	  concerns.	  Of	  interest	  here	  is	  to	  note	  that	  the	  SDM	  has	  been	  calling	  for	  all	  
stakeholders	   to	   assume	   new	   roles	   and	   responsibilities	   in	   the	   task	   of	  merging	   neoliberal	  
objectives	   with	   environmental	   and	   social	   safeguards.	   As	   further	   discussed	   in	   this	  
contribution,	   this	   has	   notably	   lead	   to	   approaches	   to	   engage	   local	   stakeholders	   into	  
participatory	  schemes,	  new	   ‘partnerships’	   initiatives	  between	   the	  private	  sector	  and	  civil	  
society,	   as	   well	   as	   new	   monitoring	   responsibilities	   assigned	   to	   both	   the	   State	   and	   the	  
private	   sector.	   However,	   and	   as	   argued	   in	   the	   following	   section,	   the	   cases	   of	   the	  
Philippines,	  Laos	  and	  PNG	  demonstrate	  that	  there	  exists	  a	  deep	  contradictions	  within	  the	  
particular	   provisions	   advocated	   by	   the	   Bank’s	   SDM,	   one	   that	   assigns	   new	   roles	   and	  
responsibilities	  to	  mining	  stakeholders.	  Crucially,	   in	  shifting	  the	  lines	  of	  accountability	  on	  
the	  ground,	  the	  SDM	  raises	  questions	  linked	  to	  the	  very	  legitimacy	  of	  what	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  
deeply	  political	  process	  descending	  from	  multilateral	  prescriptions.	  	  
II.	  THE	  WORLD	  BANK	  &	  THE	  MAKING	  OF	  NEW	  REGULATORY	  MINING	  REGIMES:	  ASIAN	  TRENDS	  
	   When	  transposed	  from	  Africa	  to	  Asia,	  Campbell’s	  mapping	  exercise	  of	  mining	  codes	  
does	  suggest	   that	   the	   trend	  has	  been	   imported	  to	   the	  region,	  albeit	  slightly	   later.	  Despite	  
the	  riches	  of	  the	  region10,	  Asian	  countries	  were	  slower	  than	  the	  other	  continents	  to	  follow	  
                                                
8 See James D. Wolfensohn’s ‘A proposal for a Comprehensive Development Framework: a Discussion Draft’ 
(1999). Such shift was notably influenced by the fact that as he took his position in 1995, Wolfensohn was 
inheriting an arrogant institution which was drawing fire from all sides of the spectrum. Amongst the numerous 
verbal critics, the international campaign Fifty Years is Enough did a lot to tarnish the institution’s already unsteady 
reputation. The environmental impact of Bank financed mega-projects (see Goldman, 2005), the systematic failure 
to consult local stakeholders, and the overall lack of transparency of the institution, were some elements of the 
shaky legacy of Wolfensohn’s predecessors –Preston and Conable. 
9 For a critical historical review of the international and internal pressures that pushed the Bank under the 
Wolfensohn presidency to adopt a new aid framework, see Hatcher (2006). 
10 According to the U.S. Geological Survey the Asia-Pacific region notably accounts for about 20 per cent of the 
world’s production of aluminium metal, 19 per cent of mined copper, 30 per cent of gold, 43 per cent of mined lead, 
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the	  multilateral	  guidelines.	  Clinching	  to	  what	  was	  defined	  as	  restrictive	  regulations,	  most	  of	  
the	  resource-­‐rich	  countries	  in	  Asia	  remained	  at	  a	  competitive	  disadvantage	  until	  the	  mid-­‐
1990s.	  	  
It	  is	  to	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  resource-­‐rich	  countries	  within	  the	  Asian	  region	  are	  at	  a	  great	  
economic	   advantage.	  Not	  withstanding	  China	   and	   India’s	   formidable	   appetite	   for	   natural	  
resources,	   the	   ‘Tigers’	   of	  Asia—Hong	  Kong,	   Japan,	   the	  Republic	   of	  Korea,	   Singapore,	   and	  
Taiwan—have	   also	   become	   important	   importers	   of	   minerals.	   As	   such	   demand	   has	  
historically	  been	  filled	  by	  Africa,	  North	  America,	  and	  South	  America	  (US	  Geological	  Survey,	  
2008:	  1.1),	  there	  has	  been	  great	  pressure	  exercised	  upon	  the	  mineral-­‐rich	  countries	  of	  the	  
region	  to	  further	  open	  their	  mining	  industry,	  especially	  the	  more	  cash-­‐strapped	  economies.	  
By	   the	   turn	   of	   the	   century,	   all	   the	   major	   nonfuel	   mineral	   producers	   in	   the	   region	   had	  
passed	  new	  regulations	  aimed	  at	  attracting	  a	  greater	  share	  of	  foreign	  investments	  (Naito,	  
Myoi,	   Otto	   and	   Kamitani,	   1998:	   92),	   notably	   China,	   India,	   Indonesia,	   Laos,	   Papua	   New	  
Guinea	  and	  the	  Philippines.	  
Three	  distinct	  Asian	  cases	  have	  been	  selected	  to	  illustrate	  the	  argument	  of	  this	  paper:	  
the	  Philippines,	  PNG	  and	  Laos.	  If	  the	  first	  two	  countries	  have	  a	  long	  history	  of	   large-­‐scale	  
mining	   activities,	   it	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   Lao’s	   industry	   is	   still	   in	   its	   infancy,	   albeit	  
expanding	  at	   a	   rapid	  pace.	  All	   three	   countries	  bare	   fantastic	  mineral	   reserves,	  which	  are	  
advertised	  as	  these	  countries’	  economic	  growth	  engine.	  With	  mineral	  resources	  valued	  at	  
almost	   $US1	   trillion,	   the	  Philippines	   ranks	  5th	  most	  mineral	   resource-­‐rich	   country	   in	   the	  
world,	   3rd	   in	   terms	   of	   gold	   reserves,	   4th	   in	   copper,	   5th	   in	   nickel,	   and	   6th	   in	   chromite	  
(Philippines	  Government,	  2010).	  PNG’s	  mineral	  industry	  has	  also	  been	  the	  cornerstone	  of	  
the	  country’s	  economy.	  In	  addition	  to	  it’s	  abundance	  of	  gold—the	  small	  country	  ranks	  11th	  
in	  the	  world	  in	  terms	  of	  gold	  production—PNG	  is	  rich	  in	  oil,	  gas,	  copper	  and	  silver,	  and	  is	  
also	   the	   object	   of	   prospection	   for	   its	   lead,	   molybdenum,	   and	   zinc.	   Along-­‐side	   the	  
Philippines	  and	  PNG,	  Lao	  PDR	  is	  strikingly	  one	  of	  Asia’s	  most	  resource-­‐rich	  country,	  with	  
more	   than	   570	   minerals	   deposits	   identified	   so	   far,	   including	   gold,	   copper,	   lead,	   tin,	  
antimony,	  zinc,	  iron,	  gems,	  gypsum,	  aggregates	  coal	  and	  potash.	  
In	  this	  section	  the	  particular	  settings	  in	  which	  the	  three	  county	  opted	  to	  reform	  their	  
mining	   regime	   is	   analysed	   in	   conjunction	   with	   the	   particular	   role	   played	   by	   the	   World	  
Bank.	  
2.1	  The	  case	  of	  the	  Philippines	  
	   If,	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  World	  Bank,	  all	  the	  mineral-­‐endowed	  Asian	  countries	  
have	  recently	  began	   to	  actively	  compete	   for	   the	  most	  deregulated	  and	   liberalised	  mining	  
regime,	  it	  is	  to	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  Philippines11	  came	  in	  as	  one	  of	  the	  regional	  front-­‐runners.	  	  
In	  addition	  to	   its	  direct	   involvement	   in	  the	  drafting	  of	   the	  1995	  Mining	  Act12—which	  
remains	   the	   cornerstone	   of	   the	   Philippines’	   current	   mining	   regime—the	   particular	  
historical	   influence	   of	   the	   Bank	   in	   the	   country	   has	   been	   sizeable.	   With	   an	   estimated	  
external	  debt	  of	  US$66.27	  billion13,	  the	  multilateral	  pressures	  for	  the	  country	  to	  liberalise	  
its	   economy	  and	  attract	  FDI	  have	   indeed	  been	  unrelenting	   since	   the	  1980s.	  Of	  particular	  
concern	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  was	  that	  the	  Philippines	  didn’t	  have	  what	  was	  deemed	  to	  be	  a	  
                                                                                                                                                       
59 per cent of mined manganese, 36 per cent of mined nickel, 41 per cent of steel, and 37 per cent of mined zinc 
(1998: 1.3). 
11 The section on the Filipino case is based on a more extensive Working Paper titled ‘Investment-Risk in the 
Philippines: Multilateral Mining Regimes, National Strategies and Local Tensions’ (Faculty of International 
Relation’s Working Paper Series, January 2011).  
12 See Coupry (2007); Doyle, Wicks and Nally (2006); Loki (2009). 
13 As of 2008 (CIA, 2010). 
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solid	  mining	  framework	  to	  attract	  FDI.	  Not	  only	  was	  the	  country	  considered	  unattractive	  in	  
terms	   of	   its	   overall	   fiscal	   incentives,	   the	  minimum	   requirement	   for	   60	   per	   cent	   Filipino	  
ownership	   in	   mining	   activities	   enshrined	   in	   the	   Constitution	   further	   contributed	   to	  
seriously	   displease	   potential	   foreign	   investors.	   In	   fact,	   the	   lack	   of	   FDI	   incentives	   was	  
considered	  to	  be	  the	  root	  cause	  of	  what	  was	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  ‘crisis’	  that	  was	  plaguing	  the	  
country’s	  mining	  industry	  at	  the	  time.	  
Much	   of	   this	   narrative	   over	   the	   urgent	   need	   to	   make	   the	   Filipino	   industry	   more	  
attractive	  to	  FDI	  was—and	  remains—built	  on	  the	  sector’s	  former	  glory.	  If	  today	  the	  sector	  
only	  accounts	  for	  7	  per	  cent	  of	  total	  exports,	  officials	  are	  quick	  to	  emphasise	  that	  during	  the	  
early	  1970s,	  and	  again	   in	  1980,	   it	  accounted	   for	  22	  per	  cent	  of	   total	  exports14.	  While	   the	  
drastic	   decline	   of	   the	   industry	   is	   indeed	   blatant,	   it	   is	   interesting	   to	   note	   that	   the	   causal	  
effect	  of	  this	  decline	  and	  the	  provisions	  enshrined	  within	  the	  mining	  regime	  might	  not	  have	  
been	  as	  straightforward	  as	  frequently	  argued.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  fluctuation	  of	  world	  prices,	  
the	   financial	   crisis,	   and	   specific	   environmental	   problems	   (both	   natural	   and	   corporate	  
negligence),	   the	   constant	   reverence	   to	   the	   past	   glory	   of	   the	   Filipino	  mining	   sector	   often	  
fails	   to	   account	   for	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   sector	  was	   strictly	   controlled	   by	   the	  Marcos	   regime	  
throughout	   the	   period	   of	   the	   dictatorship.	   Notwithstanding	   the	   fact	   that	   Marcos	   had	   a	  
direct	   interest	   in	   the	  mining	   industry15,	  wage	   control	   as	  well	   as	  union	   suppression	  were	  
systematic	   under	   his	   administration,	   thus	   keeping	   costs	   artificially	   low	   (Nettleton,	  
Whitmore	   and	   Glennie,	   2004:	   6).	   Bello	   et	   al.	   further	   note	   that	   an	   important	   feature	   of	  
Marcos’	  Mineral	  Resources	  Development	  Decree16,	  which	  was	  passed	   in	  1974	   in	  order	   to	  
jumpstart	   the	   industry,	   was	   a	   complete	   disregard	   for	   the	   occupants	   of	   the	   lands	   to	   be	  
exploited,	  notably	  the	  indigenous	  communities	  (Bello	  et	  al.,	  2004:	  225).	  	  
Setting	  aside	  key	  factors	  such	  as	  the	  declining	  demands	  of	  the	  world	  markets,	  as	  well	  
as	  vital	  elements	  of	  the	  country’s	  political-­‐economy	  history,	  the	  Ramos	  Presidency	  opted	  to	  
reform	   the	   Philippines’	   mining	   framework	   in	   order	   to	   unequivocally	   attract	   foreign	  
investors17.	   Passed	   into	   law	   in	   1995,	   the	   Republic	   Act	   7942	  marked	   the	   country’s	   clear	  
adherence	   to	   multilateral	   guidelines.	   Fifteen	   years	   later,	   it	   remains	   one	   of	   the	   most	  
favourable	  laws	  to	  mining	  in	  the	  region.	  	  
In	  line	  with	  the	  World	  Bank’s	  recommendations,	  the	  Mining	  Law	  offers	  a	  very	  generous	  
incentive	  package	  for	  investors.	  The	  Act	  guarantees	  repatriation	  of	  all	  earnings,	  capital	  and	  
loan	  payments	  to	  foreign	  entities;	  mineral	  agreements	  have	  a	  term	  of	  25	  years,	  renewable	  
for	  an	  additional	  25	  years.	  Furthermore,	  it	  offers	  a	  host	  of	  financial	  incentives	  to	  guarantee	  
returned	  investments	  and	  profitability	  to	  mining	  contractors:	  it	  reduces	  royalties—notably	  
to	   two	  per	   cent	   on	   gold—and	  provides	  multiple	   and	   generous	   tax	   incentives	   including	   a	  
four-­‐year	  income	  tax	  holiday;	  tax	  and	  duty-­‐free	  capital	  equipment	  imports;	  value-­‐added	  tax	  
exemptions;	   income	  tax	  deductions	  where	  operations	  are	  posting	   losses;	  and	  accelerated	  
depreciation	   (US	   Geological	   Survey,	   1996:	   1).	   Moreover,	   Chapter	   XVI	   of	   the	   Act	   offers	  
investment	   guarantees	   such	   as	   repatriation	   of	   investments;	   remittance	   of	   earnings;	  
                                                
14 The country’s mineral exports (annual average) declined to 16.1 per cent between 1975-1985 (back to 21.3 per 
cent in 1980). Since 1986, the average value of mineral exports per year has been equal to only 7.3 per cent of the 
country’s total foreign exchange earnings (Rovillos, Ramo and Corpuz, 2005: 188). More recently, the Philippines 
dropped from the 7th place in world production of gold (in 1988) to the 17th place (in 1997), and copper production 
fell by 90 per cent (Nettleton, Whitmore and Glennie, 2004: 7) 
15 For example, it is estimated that about half of the Marcopper mine, which was 39.99 per cent owned by Placer 
Development (later Placer Dome), was owned by Marcos himself through a number of cover companies (Nettleton, 
Whitmore and Glennie, 2004: 7). 
16 Presidential Decree No. 463. 
17 Of particular interest is that Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, one of the main authors of the Act was soon to become the 
country’s President (2001-2010). 
 8 
freedom	  from	  expropriation	  by	  the	  government;	  as	  well	  as	  a	  guarantee	  of	  confidentiality.	  
Crucially,	   in	  addition	  to	  the	  three	  modes	  of	  mineral	  agreement18	  stated	  in	  the	  Mining	  
Act,	   contractors	   may	   apply	   for	   a	   Financial	   or	   Technical	   Assistance	   Agreement	   (FTAA),	  
which	  is	  a	  contract	  involving	  assistance	  for	  large-­‐scale	  exploration,	  development,	  and	  use	  
of	   mineral	   resources19.	   Not	   without	   any	   controversy,	   the	   FTAA	   allows	   for	   100	   per	   cent	  
foreign	  ownership	  of	  mining	  properties.	  Of	  particular	  generosity,	  and	  therefore	  one	  of	  the	  
most	  divisive	  provisions	  in	  the	  Act,	  is	  the	  extensiveness	  of	  the	  areas	  that	  are	  up	  for	  grabs.	  
The	  legislation	  states	  that	  ‘all	  mineral	  resources	  in	  public	  or	  private	  lands	  […]	  shall	  be	  open	  
to	   mineral	   agreements	   or	   [FTAA]	   applications’	   (Chapter	   III,	   Sec.	   18).	   While	   the	   Act	   has	  
provisions	   barring	   mining	   activities	   from	   zones	   with	   ‘ecological	   value’,	   activities	   can	  
nonetheless	  proceed	  upon	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  government	  or	  other	  concerned	  parties.	  The	  
government	   commits	   itself	   to	  ensuring	   the	   removal	  of	   all	   ‘obstacles’	   to	  mining,	   including	  
settlements	  and	   farms.	   In	  other	  words,	  as	   the	   law	  provides	  auxiliary	  rights	  ensuring	   that	  
the	   mining	   rights	   are	   exercised	   unhampered,	   companies	   have	   priority	   access	   to	   water	  
resources	  within	   their	   concession,	   the	   right	   to	   build	   necessary	   infrastructure	   on	   private	  
lands	   as	   well	   as	   timber	   rights	   within	   the	   mining	   area	   as	   necessitated	   by	   the	   mining	  
operations	  (Philippines	  International	  Review,	  2009).	  	  
The	   1995	  Mining	   Act	  was	   hailed	   by	   the	   country’s	   Chamber	   of	  Mines	   as	   ‘a	   landmark	  
legislation,	   a	   fruit	   of	   their	   years	   of	   persistent	   lobby	   in	   Congress	   and	   Senate’	   (quoted	   in	  
Rovillos,	   Ramo	   and	   Corpuz,	   2003:	   7).	   Tailored	   to	   attract	   international	   attention,	   the	  
passage	  of	  the	  Act	  was	  met	  with	  a	  flock	  of	  foreign	  investors.	  From	  1994	  to	  1996	  alone,	  the	  
number	  of	  foreign	  mining	  companies	  represented	  in	  the	  country	  increased	  by	  400	  per	  cent	  
(US	  Geological	  Survey,	  1996	  in	  Holden	  and	  Jacobson,	  2007:	  481).	  	  
In	  1997	  however,	  triggered	  by	  the	  Marcopper	  spillage20	  (March	  1996),	  a	  large	  number	  
of	  NGOs	  and	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  filed	  a	  petition	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  to	  challenge	  the	  new	  
Law21.	  Seven	  years	  later,	  in	  its	  2004	  ruling,	  the	  Court	  held	  as	  unconstitutional	  parts	  of	  the	  
Mining	  Act22.	  The	  ruling	  was	  however	  short-­‐lived,	  as	  it	  reversed	  its	  decision	  by	  the	  end	  of	  
the	  same	  year.	  Building	  on	  the	  momentum	  of	  a	  Mining	  Law	  now	  free	  of	  its	  legal	  hurdles	  and	  
with	   the	   assistance	   of	   the	  World	  Bank,	   the	  Arroyo	  Government	   unleashed	   an	   aggressive	  
pro-­‐mining	  campaign,	  stating	  that	  it	  was	  shifting	  its	  mining	  policy	  ‘from	  mere	  tolerance	  to	  
promotion	   for	   the	   revitalisation	   of	   the	   minerals	   industry’	   (MGB,	   2008).	   Of	   interest	  
however,	   is	   that	  despite	   the	   fact	   that	   it	  was	  crippled	  by	   the	  heightened	  risk	   faced	  by	   the	  
industry	  during	  the	  legal	  challenges,	  the	  sector	  had	  nonetheless	  seen	  an	  increase	  of	  more	  
                                                
18 These are the Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA), the Co-Producing Agreement and the Joint 
Venture Agreement. The MPSA is a production agreement which can last for up to 25 years. Approved by the 
DENR, it requires that a foreign corporation own no more than 40 per cent of the mineral project. 
19 This Agreement requires an investment of at least US$50 million and can last for up to 25 years—renewable for 
another period of 25 years. 
20 The environmental tragedy, which was to be known as the worst environmental incident ever sustained in the 
Philippines, further polarised public opinions against large-scale mining. Located on Marinduque Island, the 
disaster, which unleashed between 1.5 to 3 million cubic meters of toxic mining slurries and tailings into the 
Makulapnit and Boac rivers, was caused by the failing of a cement plug in the Tapian pit drainage tunnel. In 
essence, as observed by Bello et al., ‘the spillage inundated the whole length of the Boac River which goes through 
almost the entire island, thereby effectively killing the small island’s ecosystem and livelihood’ (2004: 224). 
21 La Bugal Tribal Association Inc., et al. v. Victor O. Ramos, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, 
et al. (G.R. No. 127882). 
22 The Court found that the Acts’ provision by which full ownership of mining operations were permitted through 
the FTAA were unconstitutional. The ruling stated that the provisions that could be given to foreign companies in 
large-scale exploration were indeed limited to technical and financial assistance by the 1987 Constitution and that 
the Mining Act provisions on the FTAAs were therefore unconstitutional. 
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than	  50	  per	  cent	  in	  foreign	  investments	  between	  1995	  and	  2001	  (Nettleton,	  Whitmore	  and	  
Glennie,	  2004:	  9).	  	  
Sponsored	   and	   promoted	   by	   the	   World	   Bank23,	   this	   second	   burst	   to	   stimulate	   the	  
sector	   took	   the	   form	   of	   the	   National	   Policy	   Agenda	   on	   Revitalizing	   Mining	   in	   the	  
Philippines24	   (NMP).	   The	   key	   strategies	   and	   activities	   to	   implement	   a	   new	   ‘paradigm	  on	  
mining’	  were	  later	  detailed	  in	  the	  2004	  Mineral	  Action	  Plan25	  (MAP).	  The	  latter	  instigated	  
changes	  in	  regulatory	  requirements	  for	  mining	  prospectors,	  simplifying	  the	  mining	  permit	  
process	   to	   reduce	   the	   length	   of	   time	  needed	   for	   investors	   to	   receive	   the	   approvals	   for	   a	  
mineral	  production	  agreement	   in	   this	   country26.	   In	   sum,	   the	  Arroyo	  Presidency	  has	  been	  
multiplying	   its	   efforts	   to	   transform	   the	   sector	   into	   a	   ‘key	   driver’	   of	   the	   economy	  
(Philippines	  Government,	  2010),	  seeking	  to	  further	  increase	  foreign	  investments	  to	  US$10	  
billion	   by	   2011	   (Loki,	   2009).	   ‘The	   Philippine	   mining	   industry	   has	   been	   rejuvenated’,	  
markets	  today	  the	  Government	  (Philippines	  Government,	  2010).	  
It	  is	  to	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  IFC	  is	  also	  eager	  to	  participate	  to	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  sector.	  
Jesse	  Ang	  of	   IFC-­‐Philippines	   observes	   that	  while	   the	   country	   is	   the	  Corporation’s	   largest	  
portfolio,	  it	  had	  been	  unable	  to	  invest	  in	  mining	  precisely	  because	  of	  the	  Mining	  Act’s	  legal	  
challenges:	  ‘Now	  we’re	  just	  catching	  up’,	  concludes	  Ang	  (Interview,	  2010).	  Today,	  the	  IFC	  is	  
actively	  seeking	  to	  invest	  US$900M	  in	  the	  country	  (Ordinario,	  2009).	  
The	  Philippines	  and	  the	  social-­development	  model	  
	   While	  the	  politics	  of	  such	  narrative	  are	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  following	  section,	  it	  is	  here	  
crucial	   to	   note	   the	   omnipresence	   of	   the	   Social-­‐Development	   Model	   (SDM)	   within	   these	  
latest	  generation	  of	  mining	  regimes	  promoted	  under	  the	   leadership	  of	  the	  World	  Bank.	   If	  
resolutely	  tailored	  to	  promote	  FDI,	  the	  Filipino	  mining	  regime	  was	  also	  hailed	  as	  ‘one	  of	  the	  
most	  modern’	   in	   the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	   region	   in	   terms	   of	   environmental	   and	   social	   provisions	  
(US	  Geological	  Survey,	  2000:	  21.1).	  Despite	  being	  more	  than	  15	  years	  old,	  the	  1995	  Filipino	  
Act	   embraced	   quite	   an	   impressive	   array	   of	   environmental	   and	   social	   provisions,	  making	  
the	  Act	  one	  of	  the	  earliest	  ‘third-­‐generation’	  of	  mining	  codes	  in	  the	  region.	  	  
In	  line	  with	  the	  SDM,	  a	  first	  analysis	  of	  the	  Philippines’	  mining	  regime	  does	  suggest	  that	  
the	   country	   has	   succeeded	   in	   balancing	   the	   quest	   for	   investment	   with	   solid	   socio-­‐
environmental	  standards.	   In	  addition	   to	  provisions	   for	  companies	   to	  secure	   the	  Free	  and	  
Prior	  Informed	  Consent	  (FPIC)	  of	   indigenous	  peoples,	   the	  Mining	  Act	  requires	  companies	  
to	   clean	   up	   the	   exploited	   sites.	   Crucially,	   it	   further	   dedicates	   provisions	   for	   the	  
redistribution	  of	  benefits	  among	  the	  local	  mining	  stakeholders,	  notably	  indigenous	  people.	  
Additionally,	   the	   Indigenous	   Peoples	   Rights	   Act27	   (IPRA),	   which	  was	   enacted	   in	   October	  
1997,	   further	  entrenched	  strong	  social	  components	   in	  the	  overall	  Filipino	  mining	  regime.	  
Although	  highly	  debated28,	  the	  IPRA	  was	  recognised	  as	  ‘a	  milestone	  in	  the	  long	  struggle	  for	  
the	   recognition	   of	   indigenous	   peoples’	   rights’	   (Philippines	   International	   Review,	   2009).	  
Concretely,	  the	  IPRA	  aimed	  to	  implement	  the	  constitutional	  provisions	  regarding	  the	  rights	  
of	  indigenous	  cultural	  communities29.	  It	  spells	  out	  the	  right	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  to	  their	  
                                                
23 On the subject, see Doyle, Wicks and Nally (2006). 
24 Executive Order No. 270. Issued on January 16th, 2004 with amendments on April 20th. 
25 Memorandum Circular No. 67. 
26 While the average waiting period was three to five years, investors would now have to wait only six months (US 
Geological Survey, 2007: 21.1). 
27 Republic Act No 8371. 
28 A great deal of debate was spurred by section 56 of IPRA, which states that property rights within the ancestral 
domains already existing and/or vested, shall be recognised and respected, therefore allowing mining companies 
licensed by the Government under the 1995 Mining Act to continue their operations in these domains. 
29 Notably Article II (section 22); Article XII (section 5); and Article XIV (section 17) of the 1987 Constitution.  
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ancestral	   domains,	   their	   right	   to	   self-­‐governance	   and	   empowerment,	   their	   social	   and	  
human	  rights,	  and	  their	  right	  to	  cultural	  integrity	  (Philippines	  International	  Review,	  2009).	  
Subsequently	  created	  by	  the	  IPRA,	  the	  National	  Commission	  on	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  (NCIP)	  
issued	   the	   Implementing	   Rules	   and	   Regulations30,	   which	   notably	   recognised	   ‘ancestral	  
domains’	  of	  indigenous	  communities.	  As	  owner	  of	  the	  land,	  therefore,	  the	  communities	  are	  
to	  give	  FPIC	  for	  a	  mining	  project	  to	  be	  instigated	  on	  their	  land.	  
Furthermore,	   the	   Arroyo	   Government’s	   renewed	   efforts	   to	   stimulate	   FDI	   have	  
mirrored	   the	   multilateral	   stance	   on	   sustainable	   mining.	   ‘Our	   vision’,	   states	   the	   Filipino	  
Government,	  is:	  	  
A	   mining	   and	   minerals	   industry	   that	   is	   not	   only	   prosperous	   but	   also	   socially,	  
economically	   and	   environmentally	   sustainable,	   with	   broad	   community	   and	   political	  
support,	  while	  positively	  and	  progressively	  assisting	  in	  the	  government’s	  program	  on	  
poverty	  alleviation	  and	  contributing	  to	  the	  general	  economic	  well-­‐being	  of	  the	  nation.	  
(MGB,	  2005)	  
	   The	   SDM’s	   focus	   on	   ‘participation’	   and	   multi-­‐stakeholder	   consensus	   was	   notably	  
clearly	   embedded	   within	   the	   National	   Policy	   Agenda	   on	   Revitalizing	   Mining	   in	   the	  
Philippines	   (NMP)	   and	   the	   Mineral	   Action	   Plan	   (MAP),	   which,	   as	   explained	   earlier,	  
embodied	  the	  latest	  burst	  to	  stimulate	  the	  sector	  in	  the	  Philippines.	  It	  is	  to	  be	  further	  noted	  
that	  the	  NMP	  was	  presented	  as	  the	  result	  of	  a	  participatory	  and	  inclusive	  nine	  months	  pan-­‐
national	   endeavour,	   a	   process	   that	   was	   incidentally	   financed	   by	   the	   World	   Bank.	   The	  
language	   of	   NMP	   echoes	   the	   multilateral	   stance	   by	   which	   the	   social	   and	   environmental	  
risks	  of	  mining	  activities	  can	  be	  mitigated	  with	  solid	  environmental	  and	  social	  protection	  
standards	  (MGB,	  2008).	  Corollary,	   the	  MAP	  was	  presented	  as	   the	  product	  of	  a	  consensus	  
arising	   from	  a	  consultation	  process.	  The	  MAP	  states	   that	   it	  has	   ‘incorporated	  most	  of	   the	  
comments	   of	   other	   government	   agencies,	   and	   the	   Minerals	   Industry	   and	   Civil	  
Society/NGOs’	   (Philippines	   Government,	   2004).	   Interestingly	   however,	   the	   participatory	  
nature	  of	  the	  MAP	  and	  NMP	  was	  energetically	  contested	  by	  civil	  society	  for	  being	  far	  less	  
inclusive	   than	   advertised.	   In	   their	   analysis	   of	   the	   draft	   NMP,	   Nettleton,	   Whitmore	   and	  
Glennie	  conclude	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘dialogue’	  entrenched	  within	  the	  initiative	  rather	  reflects	  
the	   government’s	   belief	   ‘that	   civil	   society	   needs	   only	   to	   be	   educated	   to	   overcome	   its	  
emotional	   resistance	   to	   mining’	   (2004:	   9),	   a	   point	   that	   stems	   from	   a	   framework	   which	  
carries	  a	  particular	  politics	  of	  mining,	  as	  argued	  in	  the	  last	  section	  of	  this	  contribution.	  
2.2	  The	  case	  of	  Papua	  New	  Guinea	  
	   Along	  the	  Philippines,	  Papua	  New	  Guinea	  (PNG)	  has	  a	  long	  and	  rich	  history	  of	  mining	  
activities.	   The	   1992	   Mining	   and	   the	   Petroleum	   Acts	   still	   govern	   the	   country’s	   mining	  
activities,	   which	   have	   resolutely	   been	   focused	   on	   the	   pursuit	   of	   foreign	   investors.	  
According	  to	  the	  Act,	  all	  minerals	  are	  the	  property	  of	  the	  State	  and	  therefore,	  all	  land	  and	  
any	  water	  lying	  over	  the	  land	  are	  deemed	  available	  for	  exploration	  and	  mining.	  As	  it	  is	  the	  
case	  for	  the	  Philippines,	  the	  PNG	  government	  may	  grant	  exploration	  and	  mining	  licenses	  on	  
reserve	  land	  areas,	  although	  it	  may	  also	  choose	  to	  exclude	  such	  land	  from	  mining	  activities	  
if	  it	  is	  considered	  in	  the	  best	  interest	  of	  the	  State.	  Large-­‐scale	  operations	  in	  the	  country	  are	  
principally	  the	  subject	  of	  Special	  Mining	  Leases31	  (SML),	  which	  may	  be	  granted	  for	  up	  to	  40	  
years	  (may	  be	  extended	  for	  a	  period	  up	  to	  20	  years).	  	  
While	   throughout	   the	   1970s	   and	   1980s	   the	   country’s	   competitive	   fiscal	   regime	  was	  
                                                
30 NCIP Administrative Order No. 98-1. 
31 SML give tenure to carry out construction and operations for the mining of a large mineral deposit.  
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seen	   as	   a	  model	   to	   follow,	   the	   subsequent	   decade	  witnessed	   several	   amendments	   to	   the	  
fiscal	   regime,	   which	   increased	   the	   taxation	   load	   on	   investors.	   Therefore,	   the	   end	   of	   the	  
1990s	   judged	   the	   fiscal	   regime	   judged	   uncompetitive	   by	  World	  Bank	   standards.	  What	   is	  
key	  to	  note	  here	  is	  that	  despite	  a	  harsh	  report	  card	  delivered	  by	  the	  Bank	  over	  a	   regime,	  
which	  was	  bringing	  down	  the	  confidence	  of	  potential	  investors,	  the	  sector	  was	  nonetheless	  
contributing	   massively	   to	   the	   country’s	   GDP	   at	   the	   time.	   In	   2000,	   about	   20	   per	   cent	   of	  
PNG’s	  GDP	  was	  fed	  by	  the	  sector.	  As	  such,	  the	  ‘failing	  grade’	  allocated	  to	  the	  county	  should	  
rather	   be	   viewed	   as	   growing	   pressures	   to	   further	   liberalise	   the	   sector	   to	   become	   even	  
more	  attractive	  to	  foreign	  investors,	  notably	  fiscally.	  	  
Amidst	   reforms	  across	   the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	   region,	  PNG	   sat	   forth	   to	   tackle	   this	  decline	   in	  
investors’	   confidence.	   Here	   the	  World	   Bank	   became	   significantly	   involved.	   As	   part	   of	   its	  
institutional	   capacity	  building	  program,	   the	  multilateral	  organisation	  provided	  assistance	  
in	  legal	  and	  policy	  advice	  for	  the	  sector	  (MRA,	  2011:	  11).	  Crucially,	  by	  2007,	  the	  Bank	  had	  
notably	  assisted	  the	  government	  with	  the	  Drafting	  of	  the	  Mineral	  Resources	  Authority	  Bill,	  
the	   Corporate	   Plan,	   and	   a	   revision	   of	   the	   Mining	   Act.	   These	   reforms	   brought	   the	  
government	  to	  notably	  reduce	  corporate	  tax	  to	  30	  per	  cent	  and	  withholding	  tax	  to	  10	  per	  
cent;	  increase	  the	  loss	  carry	  forward	  from	  7	  to	  20	  years;	  offer	  a	  fiscal	  stability	  guarantees	  
for	   10-­‐20	   years	   for	   new	   projects;	   abolish	   additional	   profits	   tax;	   relax	   the	   ‘ring-­‐fence’	  
provision	  to	  allow	  a	  tax	  deduction	  of	  up	  to	  25	  per	  cent	  of	  allowable	  exploration	  expenses32;	  
and	  double	  deductions	  of	  preproduction	  exploration	  costs33.	  Furthermore,	  the	  Government	  
initiated	   a	   review	   of	   its	   position	   on	   equity	   participation	   in	   mining	   projects—it	   had	   the	  
option	  of	  taking	  a	  paid	  equity	  stake	  of	  up	  to	  30	  per	  cent	  in	  a	  project.	  	  
The	   reforms	  were	   quite	   successful	   as	   the	   sector’s	   contribution	   to	   the	   country’s	   GDP	  
saw	  a	  steady	  increase	  for	  the	   last	  eighth	  consecutive	  years	  (US	  Geological	  Survey,	  2010a:	  
22.1).	   Not	   withstanding	   the	   high	   level	   of	   exploration	   activity	   in	   the	   sector,	   the	   value	   of	  
exported	  minerals,	  excluding	  crude	  oil,	  was	  about	  $2.8	  billion	  in	  2009—62	  per	  cent	  of	  total	  
goods	  exported	  (US	  Geological	  Survey,	  2010a:	  22.2).	  	  
In	  2008,	  despite	  the	  multiplication	  of	  investments	  in	  the	  sector,	  the	  country	  opted,	  with	  
the	  assistance	  of	  the	  World	  Bank,	  to	  further	  reform	  its	  mining	  regime.	  Building	  on	  an	  initial	  
loan	   to	   the	   sector	   (2000-­‐2006),	   the	   Bank	   issued	   an	   additional	   technical	   assistance	   loan	  
(US$	   17	   million)	   to	   the	   country.	   The	   2008	   loan	   is	   notably	   dedicated	   to	   assist	   the	  
government	   in	   its	   review	   of	   the	   country’s	   existing	   mining	   policy	   and	   regulatory	  
frameworks,	   as	   well	   as	   strengthening	   mining	   sector	   governance,	   regulation,	   and	  
sustainable	  development	  outcomes	  (World	  Bank	  2008	  Project	  ID:	  P102396).	  
The	  World	  Bank’s	  presence	  in	  the	  sector	  extends	  beyond	  the	  reform	  of	  fiscal	  incentives	  
and	   legal	   provisions	   designed	   to	   attract	   foreign	   investors.	   The	   institution’s	   reach	   is	  
particularly	   felt	   in	   the	  promotion	  of	  socio-­‐environmental	  safeguards	  within	   the	  country’s	  
regime,	  in	  line	  with	  the	  SDM.	  As	  such,	  by	  2007,	  it	  had	  notably	  assisted	  the	  government	  with	  
the	   revision	   of	   the	  mining	   safety	   act,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   country’s	  mines	   closure	   policy.	   The	  
multilateral	   organisation	  was	   further	   involved	   in	   the	  drafting	  of	   guidelines	   for	   review	  of	  
feasibility	   studies	   and	   the	   guidelines	   for	   best	   practice	   in	   mining,	   milling	   and	   tailings	  
management	   (MRA,	   2011:	   11),	   as	   well	   as	   in	   the	   review	   of	   the	   country’s	   technical	   audit	  
training;	   mineral	   tenements	   management;	   sustainable	   development	   policy;	   geological	  
survey	  capacity	  building;	  geological	  information	  services	  development	  and	  support	  for	  the	  
internal	  revenue	  commission	  for	  mining	  and	  petroleum	  company	  audits.	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  PNG’s	  2008-­‐2011	  Country	  Assistance	  Strategy,	  which	  notably	  entails	  
                                                
32 Provided that the deduction does not reduce the tax payable by more than 25 per cent. 
33 The first 100 per cent deduction would be allowed as a deduction against assessable income, while the second 
deduction would arise only once commercial production begins. 
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greater	   cooperation	   with	   the	   Bank	   on	   the	   promotion	   of	   ‘a	   strong,	   accountable	   and	  
sustainable	  performance	  of	   resource-­‐based	  exports’,	   the	  SDM	   is	   further	  embedded	   in	   the	  
Bank’s	  2008	  Technical	  Assistance	   loan	   to	   the	   country.	   It	   contracts	   the	  Bank	   to	  help	  PNG	  
strengthen	   its	   mining	   sector	   governance,	   regulation,	   and	   sustainable	   development	  
outcomes.	  Here	  the	  Bank	  states	  that	  the	  expected	  outputs	  of	  the	  project	  notably	  include	  the	  
completion	   of	   several	   key	   policies	   and	   legislative	   Acts,	   including	   a	   Sustainable	   Mining	  
Development	   Policy,	   with	   mine	   closure	   and	   resettlement	   guidelines,	   and	   an	   Offshore	  
Mining	   Policy	   and	   associated	   legislation;	   a	   Small-­‐Scale	   Mining	   Occupational	   Health	   and	  
Safety	  Act;	   a	  new	  Mining	  Safety	  Act;	   and	  a	   review	  of	   and	  amendments	   to	   the	  Mining	  Act	  
1992	   (World	   Bank	   2008	   Project	   ID:	   P102396).	   In	   line	  with	   the	   SDM	   the	   project	   further	  
introduces	   a	   narrative	   strongly	   focussed	   on	   local	   communities’	   participation	   and	  
empowerment,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  need	  for	  a	  better	  governance	  of	  mining	  revenues	  in	  order	  to	  
ensure	   local	   benefit.	   The	   Bank	   states	   that	   the	   project	   is	   to	   support	   communities	   ‘to	   be	  
better	   able	   to	   monitor	   the	   delivery	   of	   community	   programs	   and	   services,	   empowering	  
disadvantaged	   groups—including	   women	   and	   youth—in	   areas	   affected	   by	   extractive	  
industries’	  (World	  Bank,	  2009).	  It	  further	  states	  that	  it	  aims	  to	  improve	  the	  benefits	  from	  
the	   extractive	   industries—mining,	   oil	   and	   gas—to	   the	   national	   budget	   and	   to	   mining-­‐
affected	  communities34.	  
2.3	  The	  case	  of	  Lao	  PDR	  
	   The	   World	   Bank’s	   influence	   upon	   the	   mining	   regime	   of	   Laos	   is	   here	   again	   quite	  
compelling.	  Of	  particular	  interest	  to	  this	  contribution	  is	  the	  direct	  involvement	  of	  the	  Bank	  
in	  assisting	  the	  country	  in	  the	  development	  of	  its	  large-­‐scale	  mining	  industry.	  Contrary	  to	  
the	  Philippines	  and	  PNG,	  Laos	  is	  only	  starting	  to	  develop	  its	  large-­‐scale	  sector	  and	  as	  such,	  
the	   case	   allows	   for	   interesting	   insights	   in	   the	   Bank’s	   particular	   role	   in	   the	   very	  
development	   of	   the	   sector.	  With	  most	   of	   its	   mineral	   endowment	   remaining	   geologically	  
unmapped35,	  the	  country	  was	  awarded	  the	  title	  of	  one	  of	  Asia’s	  ‘final	  frontiers	  for	  miners’	  
(CLC	   Asia,	   2009).	   The	   drive	   to	   develop	   the	   mining	   sector	   undeniably	   reflects	   the	  
Government’s	   need	   to	   tackle	   its	   gargantuan	   debt	   and	   its	   status	   as	   one	   of	   Asia’s	   poorest	  
nations.	  With	  an	  external	  debt	   totalling	  76.9	  per	  cent	  of	   its	  GDP	  (World	  Bank,	  2008),	   the	  
Laotian	  Government	  is	   ‘continuing	  to	  face	  a	  high	  risk	  of	  debt	  distress’,	  observes	  the	  Bank	  
(2010b:	  9).	  The	  Organisation	   further	   estimates	   the	   country’s	  GDP	  per	   capita	   at	   $US	  940,	  
slightly	  ahead	  of	  Cambodia’s	  $US	  667,	  yet	  well	  behind	  it’s	  other	  Least	  Developed	  Country’	  
neighbours36	  (World	  Bank,	  2011).	  
Along-­‐side	  the	  Asian	  Development	  Bank,	  the	  World	  Bank	  has	  helped	  draft	  the	  country’s	  
1997	  Mining	  Law37,	  the	  very	  law	  that	  instigated	  the	  recent	  wave	  of	  FDI	  in	  Laos’	  large-­‐scale	  
sector.	  While	  mining	   activities	  were	  described	   in	   the	   early	  1990s	   as	   ‘virtually	  negligible’	  
(US	  Geological	  Survey,	  1994:	  491),	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  same	  decade,	  the	  sector	  was	  identified	  
as	  ‘one	  of	  the	  most	  promising	  long-­‐term	  growth	  areas’	  (US	  Geological	  Survey,	  1999:	  13.1).	  
The	  US	  Geological	  Survey	  further	  states	  that	  the	  country’s	  foreign	  investment	  policies	  were	  
‘the	  most	  “investor-­‐friendly”	  in	  the	  region’	  (1997:	  1).	  	  
Implemented	   by	   Decree	   in	   2002,	   the	   1997	   Mining	   Law	   did	   trigger	   a	   substantial	  
expansion	  of	  the	  sector.	  It	  is	  compelling	  to	  note	  that	  if	  the	  mining	  and	  quarrying	  sector	  only	  
contributed	  to	  1	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  country’s	  GDP	  in	  2001	  (Boland,	  Kunanayagam	  and	  Walker,	  
                                                
34 The project will also work to mitigate the mining sector’s health and safety risks for small-scale miners. 
35 As of 2009, only 50 per cent of the country area has been geologically mapped (1/200,000). 
36 Vietnam ($US 1,032), the Philippines ($US 1,752) and Indonesia ($US 2,349) (World Bank, 2011). 
37 Law No 04/97/NA on Mining (12 April 1997). 
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2001:	  i),	  it	  now	  contributes	  to	  18	  per	  cent38	  (Boungnaphalom,	  2010).	  In	  the	  last	  decade,	  the	  
resource	  sectors	  (mining	  and	  power)	  have	  become	  a	  much-­‐needed	  source	  of	  Government	  
revenue	  and	  they	  now	  accounts	  for	  most	  of	  the	  country’s	  FDI	  inflows	  (about	  80	  per	  cent	  in	  
2008)	  (World	  Bank,	  2010b:	  7).	   In	  fact,	  copper	  and	  gold	  account	  for	  more	  than	  half	  of	  the	  
country’s	   total	   exports	   (World	  Bank,	  2008:	  23).	  According	   to	   the	  Ministry	  of	  Energy	  and	  
Mines,	   as	   of	  March	   2010,	   there	  were	   269	   projects	   in	   the	   country,	   186	   of	  which	  were	   in	  
foreign	   hands39	   (Boungnaphalom,	   2010).	   Such	   presence	   of	   FDI,	   further	   states	   the	   U.S.	  
Geological	   Survey,	   is	   ‘largely	   owing	   to	   the	   Laotian	   Government’s	   aggressive	   efforts	   to	  
promote	   mining	   investment	   and	   to	   strengthen	   its	   management	   and	   regulation	   of	   the	  
mining	  sector	  under	   the	   framework	  of	   the	  Mining	  Law	  of	  1997	  and	   the	   Investment	  Law’	  
(2008:	  16.1).	  
As	   it	  was	   the	   case	   for	   the	  Philippines	   and	  PNG,	  despite	   a	  notable	   increase	   in	  mining	  
investments,	   the	  mining	  community,	   in	  partnership	  with	   the	  World	  Bank,	  quickly	  started	  
lobbying	  for	  a	  revision	  of	  the	  Mining	  Law.	  Of	  concern	  in	  the	  Laotian	  case,	  was	  the	  failure	  to	  
meet	  the	  clarity	  requirements	  expected	  from	  a	  ‘modern’	  regime.	  In	  addition	  to	  a	  confusion	  
over	   the	   terms	   such	   as	   the	   transfer	   of	   mining	   rights	   (Article	   39)	   and	   the	   expiration	   of	  
mining	  licences	  (Article	  34),	  the	  provisions	  for	  the	  taxation	  and	  duties	  were	  seen	  as	  a	  cause	  
for	  concern	  within	   the	   investor	  community40.	  Furthermore,	  while	   in	  practice	   the	  country	  
did	  permit	  100	  per	   cent	   FDI,	  Article	  21	   allowed	   the	   State	   to	   compel	   foreign	   investors	   to	  
accept	   the	   State’s	   participation	   in	   their	  mining	   venture.	   For	   the	   Bank,	   this	   ‘introduces	   a	  
conflict	  of	  interest	  given	  that	  it	  is	  the	  government	  which	  regulates	  the	  sector’	  (Thompson,	  
2010:	  8).	  	  
As	  such,	   in	  a	  2006	  commissioned	  report,	   the	  Bank	  argued	  for	  a	   ‘timely	  review’	  of	  the	  
country’s	   mining	   law	   and	   regulations,	   thus	   giving	   Laos	   the	   opportunity	   ‘to	   become	   the	  
leader	   in	   mining	   legislation	   reform	   in	   competitive	   agenda	   in	   line	   with	   international	  
standards’	   (World	   Bank,	   2006:	   23-­‐26).	   As	   it	   was	   the	   case	   for	   the	   Philippines,	   the	   Bank	  
strongly	  encouraged	  the	  country	  to	  compete	  against	  its	  neighbours’	  regulations	  for	  enticing	  
FDI	   in	   the	   sector.	   Here	   the	   Mining	   Law	   was	   seen	   as	   positioning	   Laos	   at	   ‘a	   competitive	  
disadvantage	  compared	  with	  its	  neighbours’	  (World	  Bank,	  2006:	  23).	  	  
While	   the	   Philippines	   modified	   its	   existing	   law	   in	   order	   to	   further	   enticed	   foreign	  
investments	  in	  the	  sector,	  in	  December	  2008,	  Laos	  adopted	  a	  new	  mining	  law	  altogether41.	  
It	  is	  to	  be	  noted	  that	  much	  of	  the	  new	  law’s	  significance	  remains	  uncertain	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  
that	   its	   implementation	   documents	   are	   yet	   to	   be	   approved42.	   In	   fact,	   the	   thirst	   for	   legal	  
clarity	  and	  enticing	  provisions	  for	  foreign	  investors	  is	  now	  the	  subject	  of	  a	  Bank	  Technical	  
Assistance	  project43.	  Approved	  in	  2010,	  the	  project	  is	  to	  develop	  the	  country’s	  capacity	  in	  
the	   mining	   and	   hydropower	   sectors,	   with	   US$2.31	   million	   specifically	   allocated	   to	   the	  
development	  of	  the	  mining	  sector.	  The	  Project	  is	  resolutely	  geared	  towards	  enticing	  FDI:	  	  
Clear	   laws	   and	   regulations	   for	   the	   mining	   sector,	   along	   with	   internationally	  
competitive	   taxation,	   are	   key	   to	   developing	   the	   sector.	   While	   the	   Government	   has	  
made	  considerable	  progress	  in	  these	  areas,	  including	  adoption	  of	  a	  new	  Minerals	  Law	  
in	   December	   2008,	   the	   legislative	   and	   regulatory	   framework	   needs	   to	   be	   completed	  
                                                
38 As of 2009.  
39 There are now about 150 mining companies operating in Laos, including companies from China, Vietnam, 
Thailand, Australia, Korea, Canada, Germany, India, Japan, UK, Russia, etc. 
40 For example, the 1997 Mining Law allowed royalty rates to fluctuate between 2 to 5 per cent of sales depending 
on mineral commodities. 
41 Law No 04/NA was made publically available only in late 2009. 
42 For now, much of the new ventures’ provisions must be negotiated with the Government. 
43 ‘TA for Capacity Development in Hydropower and Mining Sector’ (P109736). 
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(World	  Bank,	  TA	  Project	  P109736).	  
It	  is	  to	  be	  noted	  that	  while	  the	  Bank	  is	  providing	  a	  legal	  advisory	  support	  to	  complete	  the	  
on-­‐going	  legislation	  process	  towards	  a	  national	  mining	  policy,	  the	  IFC	  was	  involved	  in	  the	  
drafting	   of	   the	   country’s	   Enterprise	   Law,	   as	   well	   as	   in	   a	   technical	   assistance	   project	   to	  
prepare	  the	  new	  unified	  investment	  law	  (World	  Bank,	  2008:	  38).	  The	  private-­‐arm	  branch	  
of	  the	  WBG	  was	  further	  financing	  the	  Lao	  Business	  Forum,	  which	  is,	  according	  to	  the	  Bank:	  
‘an	   effective	   mechanism	   for	   enabling	   the	   private	   sector	   to	   raise	   their	   concerns	   to	   [the	  
Government	   of	   Laos]’	   (World	  Bank,	   2008:	   38).	   The	   funding	   notably	   provided	   the	   Forum	  
with	  a	  secretariat	  to	  support	  its	  operations	  and	  to	  revise	  the	  Mining	  Law.	  	  
In	  the	  Laotian	  case,	  the	  drive	  to	  pave	  the	  way	  for	  large-­‐scale	  foreign	  mining	  investors	  
has	  also	  been	  immersed	  in	  a	  strong	  social-­‐development	  narrative.	  The	  World	  Bank’s	  2010	  
Technical	  Assistance	  project	  is:	  ‘to	  promote	  models	  for	  corporate	  social	  responsibility,	  and	  
risk	   mitigation	   and	   community	   benefit-­‐sharing	   approaches’	   (World	   Bank,	   TA	   Project	  
P109736).	  While	  embryonic	  for	  now,	  the	  fast	  pace	  by	  which	  the	  large-­‐scale	  mining	  sector	  is	  
developing	  has	  also	  been	  met	  by	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  environmental	  protection,	  notably	  in	  
light	   of	   the	   fragile	   ecosystem,	   which	   characterises	   the	   country.	   In	   fact,	   not	   unlike	   the	  
Philippines,	  Laos	  is	  viewed	  as	  having	  an	  outstanding	  biological	   importance,	  notably	  do	  to	  
the	  fact	  that	  half	  of	  its	  forests	  remains	  untouched.	  Boungnaphalom,	  the	  country’s	  Director	  
of	   the	   Environment	   and	   Mining	   Inspection	   Division	   (Department	   of	   Mines,	   Ministry	   of	  
Energy	  and	  Mines)	  notes	  that	  in	  order	  to	  assure	  the	  sustainable	  development	  of	  the	  sector,	  
investors	  will	  have	  to	  comply	  with	  a	  framework	  which	  assures	  a	  balance	  between	  mining	  
and	  socio-­‐economic	  development	  activities,	   as	  well	   as	  natural	   resource	  conservation	  and	  
environmental	  protection;	  remedy	  any	  negative	  impacts	  that	  occur	  during	  mining	  and	  after	  
mine	  closure;	  and	  provide	  community	  development	  (Boungnaphalom,	  2010).	  
III.	  	  THE	  STATE	  AT	  WORK:	  CONFLICTING	  INTERESTS	  &	  STRATEGIC	  CHOICES	  
	   The	  most	  recent	  generation	  of	  mining	  regimes	  promoted	  by	  the	  WBG,	  as	   illustrated	  
by	   the	  cases	  of	   the	  Philippines,	  PNG	  and	  Laos,	  has	  been	  celebrated	  as	  a	   clear	  example	  of	  
legislations	   which	   successfully	   balanced	   the	   need	   to	   attract	   foreign	   investors	   and	   to	  
mitigate	   the	   socio-­‐environmental	   impacts	   of	   these	   activities.	   As	   such,	   all	   three	  
Governments	  have	  celebrated	  their	  new	  mining	  regimes	  as	  cornerstones	  of	  their	  countries’	  
economic	  future.	  However,	  while	  the	  sector	  in	  these	  countries	  has	  seen	  a	  sizeable	  increase	  
in	  foreign	  investments,	  the	  environmental,	  social	  and	  human	  rights	  dimensions	  embedded	  
in	   this	  new	  generation	  of	  mining	  regimes	  promoted	  by	   the	  Bank,	  appear	   to	  have	  been	   in	  
practice,	  relegated	  away	  from	  the	  State’s	  scrutiny.	  If	  cynics	  have	  been	  quick	  to	  dismiss	  the	  
poverty	  reduction	  narrative	  attached	  to	  the	  WBG’s	  presence	  in	  the	  sector,	  it	  is	  here	  argued	  
that	  such	  dimensions	  are	  far	  from	  a	  mere	  discursive	  exercise	  from	  cash-­‐strapped	  States	  in	  
desperate	  need	  of	  enticing	  investors.	  	  
While	   there	   does	   indeed	   exist	   a	   serious	   gap	   in	   the	  monitoring	   process	   of	   the	   socio-­‐
environmental	   clauses	   of	   the	   mining	   regime,	   as	   analysed	   further	   in	   this	   section,	   such	  
failures	  should	  rather	  be	  viewed	  as	  the	  consequences	  of	  what	  Szablowski	  (2007)	  coined	  as	  
a	  ‘strategic	  choice’	  of	  the	  State.	  In	  practice,	  such	  processes	  take	  the	  form	  of	  a	  retreat	  of	  the	  
State	  from	  its	  formal	  monitoring	  functions	  while	  simultaneously	  delegating	  its	  regulating,	  
mediating	  and	  monitoring	  functions	  upon	  the	  shoulders	  of	  the	  private	  sector.	  In	  turn,	  and	  
this	  is	  the	  argument	  brought	  forth	  by	  Campbell	  (2004;	  2009)	  in	  her	  study	  of	  African	  mining	  
regimes,	  these	  shifts	  in	  functions	  further	  impact	  the	  responsibilities	  and	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  
stakeholders	   involved	   in	  mining	   activities.	   As	   argued	   in	   this	   final	   section,	   the	   particular	  
case	  of	  the	  Philippines	  and	  PNG	  demonstrate	  that	  States	  are	  opting	  to	  be	  selectively	  absent	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as	  a	  strategy	  to	  both	  contain	  and	  manage	  opposition	  to	  mining	  activities,	  therefore	  trying	  
to	   reduce	   investment	   risk	   within	   the	   sector.	   However,	   far	   from	   serving	   its	   objective	   of	  
fostering	   greater	   political	   stability	   at	   the	   local	   and	   national	   level,	   the	   SDM	   brings	   forth	  
questions	  relating	  to	  the	   legitimacy	  of	   the	  new	  roles	  embraced	  by	  the	  private	  sector,	  and	  
the	   correlated	   heighten	   tensions	   that	   it	   brings	   forth	   between	   the	   local	   stakeholders.	  
Crucially,	  such	  process,	  it	  is	  further	  argued,	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  be	  repeated	  in	  the	  Laotian	  
mining	  sector,	  which	  is	  now	  in	  full	  expansion.	  	  
a)	  A	  strategic	  absence	  
	   There	  exists	  a	  deep	  contradiction	  within	   the	  particular	  provisions	  advocated	  by	   the	  
World	  Bank	  within	  post-­‐EIR	  mining	  regimes,	  one	  that	  requires	  the	  State	  to	  both	  promote	  
FDI	  and	  regulate	  socio-­‐environmental	  standards.	  While	  most	  of	  the	  Bank	  and	  the	  industry’s	  
literature	  present	  both	  objectives	  as	  a	  delicate	  balancing	  act,	  these	  dual	  objectives	  are	  here	  
rather	  understood	  within	  a	  set	  of	  ‘strategic	  choices’	  (Szablowski,	  2007),	  which	  they	  require	  
from	  the	  State.	  A	  first	  indication	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  such	  choices	  is	  reflected	  by	  the	  limited	  and	  
sporadic	   implementation	   of	   the	   socio-­‐environmental	   provisions	   enshrined	   in	   the	   new	  
generation	  of	  mining	  regimes,	  as	  indicated	  by	  the	  three	  case	  study.	  	  
The	  environmental	   legacy	  of	  mining	  activities	  in	  the	  Philippines	  is	  illustrative	  of	  such	  
trends.	   While	   the	   Philippines’	   Chamber	   of	   Mine	   and	   the	   Government	   downplayed44	   the	  
actual	   impact	   of	   the	   2005	   Rapu-­‐Rapu	   tailings	   spill45,	   the	   incident	   echoed	   the	   1996	  
Marcopper	  spill.	  Beyond	  these	  two	  environmental	  episodes,	  the	  Filipino	  mining	  sector	  has	  
been	   plagued	   by	   chronic	   environmental	   problems.	   The	   coastal	   dumping	   practices	   of	  
Marcopper	  would	  have	  pumped	  200	  million	   tons	  of	   toxic	  waste	  rock	  over	  a	  period	  of	  16	  
years	   (Farrell	   et	   al.,	   2004:	   8).	   A	   Christian	   Aid	   and	   Philippine	   Indigenous	   Peoples	   Links’	  
Report	  found	  that	  every	  day	  an	  estimated	  160,000	  tonnes	  of	  mine	  tailings	  would	  find	  their	  
way	   into	  rivers,	   lakes	  and	   irrigation	  systems	   in	  the	  Philippines	  (Nettleton,	  Whitmore	  and	  
Glennie,	  2004:	  17).	  The	  authors	  further	  report	  incidents	  of	  mine	  tailings	  spillage	  in	  Sipalay	  
and	   Hinobaan,	   in	   Negros	   Occidental,	   in	   Itogon,	   Benguet,	   and	   mudflows	   in	   Sibutad,	  
Zamboanga	  del	  Norte	  (2004:	  3).	  	  
Goodland,	   a	   former	   senior	   environmental	   adviser	   to	   the	   World	   Bank,	   and	   Wicks	  
observe	   that	   the	  country	   ‘may	  appear	   to	  have	  excellent	   laws	   to	  protect	   the	  environment,	  
human	   rights	   and	   indigenous	   peoples,	   yet	   their	   application	   is	   unacceptably	   poor’	  
(Goodland	   and	   Wicks,	   2009:	   2).	   The	   case	   of	   the	   National	   Commission	   on	   Indigenous	  
Peoples	   (NCIP),	   which	   is	   the	   primary	   government	   agency	   responsible	   notably	   for	   the	  
implementation	  of	  the	  policy,	  plans	  and	  programmes	  promoting	  and	  protecting	  the	  rights	  
of	   indigenous	   peoples,	   is	   revealing.	   Since	   its	   inception,	   NCIP	   has	   faced	   severe	   resource	  
limitations	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Act,	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  budget	  and	  the	  expertise	  
required	   to	  deal	  with	   complex	  matters	  of	   consent	   in	   indigenous	   communities	   (Nettleton,	  
Whitmore	   and	   Glennie,	   2004).	   Stavenhagen,	   the	   UN	   Special	   Rapporteur	   for	   the	   human	  
rights	  of	  indigenous	  peoples,	  voiced	  his	  concern	  with	  ‘the	  slow	  pace	  of	  implementation	  of	  
the	   provisions	   of	   IPRA’,	   and	   further	   observed	   ‘a	   loss	   of	   confidence	   among	   indigenous	  
organisations	  in	  the	  ability	  or	  willingness	  of	  government	  agencies	  to	  proceed	  actively	  with	  
its	  effective	  implementation’	  (2003:	  21).	  	  
Similarly,	  the	  Philippines’	  Mines	  and	  Geosciences	  Bureau	  (MGB)	  and	  the	  Department	  of	  
                                                
44 ‘It was really a minor incident, a drop in the ocean’, commented Benjamin Philip Romualdez, president of the 
Philippines’ Chamber of Mines (quoted in Llorito, 2006). 
45 The Rapu-Rapu mines saw two incidents within a few weeks. The failure of a pump caused the overflow of 
cyanide-laden tailings into nearby creeks, an incident that was followed three weeks later by heavy rains, which 
caused the tailings pond to overflow into the same creeks. 
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Environment	  and	  Natural	  Resources	  (DENR)	  appear	  to	  lack	  the	  political	  support,	  resources	  
and	   expertise	   required	   to	   effectively	   enforce	   the	   overall	   social	   and	   environmental	  
safeguards	  enshrined	  in	  the	  mining	  regime.	  The	  DENR,	  which	  is	  the	  main	  government	  body	  
responsible	   for	   mining,	   is	   expected	   to	   strive	   to	   maintain	   a	   balance	   between	   proper	  
economic	  objectives	  and	  protection	  of	  the	  environment	  within	  the	  mining	  industry	  through	  
appropriate	   regulation	   (US	  Geological	   Survey,	  1995:	  685).	  While	   the	   chronic	   issue	  of	   the	  
flight	  of	  experts	  to	  the	  private	  sector	  goes	  a	   long	  way	  to	  explain	  the	  shortage	  of	  qualified	  
staff	   within	   the	   Government	   ranks,	   the	   Department	   appears	   to	   lack	   the	   very	   resources	  
required	   to	   carry	  out	   its	   socio-­‐environmental	  mandate.	  At	   issue	  here	   is	   notably	   the	  dual	  
role	   assigned	   to	   the	   Department	   where	   it	   is	   expected	   to	   act	   both	   as	   a	   promoter	   and	   a	  
regulator	   for	   the	  sector.	  Crucially	   therefore,	   it	   appears	   that	   the	  DENR—and	   the	  NCIP—is	  
resolutely	   entrenched	  within	   the	  pro-­‐mining	   camp46	   (Vivoda,	   2008:	   133).	  The	   Structural	  
Adjustment	  Participatory	  Review	  International	  Network	  (SAPRIN)	   found	  that	   the	  DENR’s	  
regional	   offices	   and	   field	   personnel	   were	   ‘actively	   and	   aggressively	   helping	   mining	  
company	   personnel	   in	   convincing	   the	   people	   to	   accept	   the	   mining	   project’	   (quoted	   in	  
Nettleton,	   Whitmore	   and	   Glennie,	   2004:	   12).	   In	   short,	   concludes	   Jesse	   Ang	   of	   IFC-­‐
Philippines,	   with	   such	   dual	   roles	   the	   DENR	   may	   be	   qualified	   as	   ‘a	   schizophrenic	  
organisation’	  (interview,	  2010).	  	  
The	  issue	  further	  trickled	  down	  to	  the	  MGB,	  which	  ‘has	  no	  effective	  power	  to	  sanction	  
firms	   that	   violate	   regulations’,	   observes	   Walden	   Bello,	   a	   Member	   of	   Congress	   in	   the	  
Philippines’	  House	  of	  Representatives	  (Bello	  et	  al.,	  2004:	  226).	  It	  is	  thus	  unsurprising	  that	  
bureaucratic	   inefficiency	   is	   manifest	   and	   that	   the	   enforcement	   of	   regulations	   is	   ‘slow,	  
erratic	  and	   inefficient’	   (Vivoda,	  2008:	  136).	  Overall,	   further	  concludes	  Bello,	   the	  MGB:	   ‘as	  
with	   the	   entire	   government,	   is	  wracked	  by	   conflicting	  goals—that	  of	  promoting	   industry	  
and	  that	  of	  protecting	  the	  lands’	  (Bello	  et	  al.,	  2004:	  226).	  	  
Similar	   dislocations	   between	   regulatory	   capacity,	   implementation	   and	   enforcement	  
have	  been	  observed	  within	  the	  other	  two	  countries	  studied,	  suggesting	  a	  greater	  trend	  by	  
which	   in	   practice,	   states	   are	   selectively	   absenting	   themselves	   from	   their	   regulatory	   role.	  
The	   case	   of	   PNG	   is	   quite	   telling	   of	   the	   difficulties	   for	   the	   State	   to	   merge	   a	   sustainable	  
development	   narrative	   with	   increasing	   pressures	   to	   further	   develop	   its	   mining	   sector,	  
notably	  when	  such	  pressures	  appear	  to	  descend	  from	  the	  multilateral	  arena.	  It	  is	  telling	  to	  
note	  that	  article	  five	  of	  the	  1992	  Mining	  Act,	  which	  states	  that	  by	  law	  all	  the	  water	  in	  PNG	  
belongs	   to	   the	   State,	   the	  mining	   industry	   has	   been	   permitted	   to	   dispose	   of	  mine	   tailing	  
directly	  into	  rivers	  and	  oceans.	  As	  such,	  Ok	  Tedi	  would	  be	  discharging	  an	  estimated	  80,000	  
tonnes	   per	   day	   into	   the	   rivers	   and	   the	   ocean	   and	   Tolukuma	   300	   to	   400	   tonnes	   (Koma,	  
2005:	  168).	  	  
Such	   contradictions	   between	   practices	   and	   narrative	   in	   PNG	   further	   extend	   to	   the	  
recent	  creation	  in	  2005	  of	  the	  Mineral	  Resources	  Authority	  (MRA),	  which	  was	  the	  product	  
of	  a	  World	  Bank	   technical	  assistance	   loan.	   Its	  mandate	  notably	   includes	   the	  coordination	  
with	  mining	  companies	  and	  national	  and	  sub-­‐national	  government	  stakeholders,	  acting	  on	  
behalf	   of	   the	   government	   in	   negotiating	   contracts	   for	   new	   mining	   developments,	   and	  
inspection	   and	   control	   of	   the	   industry47.	   However,	   according	   to	   James	   Wanjik,	   PNG’s	  
former	  secretary	  for	  mining,	  in	  practice,	  the	  MRA	  allows	  for	  the	  industry	  to	  regulate	  itself:	  
                                                
46 Along the country’s Presidency, the Majority of the Congress, the mining investors and the Chamber of Mines. 
On the subject, see Vivoda (2008). 
47 A 2010 World Bank project is further designed to support the development of MRA’s capacity to become 
effective in the following three functional areas: i) Strengthen governance and accountability in the mining sector, 
ii) Promote, license, control, and monitor mining sector development, and iii) Improve sustainable development 
outcomes from the mining sector. 
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‘Yielding	  to	  pressure	  from	  World	  Bank	  and	  European	  Union	  the	  Government	  gave	  away	  its	  
regulatory	  responsibility	  and	  compromised	  policy	  making	  powers’	   (2007).	  The	  new	  MRA	  
appears	  to	  be	  the	  source	  of	  multiple	  controversies,	  ranging	  from	  corruption	  to	  conflict	  of	  
interests	  between	   the	  World	  Bank	  and	   the	  government	   (Wanjik,	  2007;	  PNG	  Mine	  Watch,	  
2010).	   Beyond	   the	   disputes	   attached	   to	   the	   MRA,	   the	   group	   PNG	   Mine	   Watch	   (2010)	  
observed	   that	   the	  MRA’s	   pro-­‐mining	   interests	   are	   unquestionable.	   The	  MRA	  would	   have	  
hire	  one	  of	  the	  regions	  largest	  law	  firms,	  Allens	  Arthur	  Robinson,	  to	  defeat	  a	  case	  brought	  
by	  a	  group	  of	   indigenous	   landowners	  worried	  by	   the	  potential	  environmental	   impacts	  of	  
the	  new	  Ramu	  nickel	  mine	  (PNG	  Mine	  Watch,	  2010).	  	  
Similarly	  in	  Laos,	  there	  are	  distinct	  signs	  which	  may	  indicate	  that,	  as	  it	  is	  the	  case	  in	  the	  
Philippines	  and	  PNG,	  the	  capacity	  of	  the	  Laotian	  government	  to	  actually	  carry	  out	  the	  socio-­‐
environmental	   safeguards	   enshrine	  within	   its	   overall	  mining	   regime	   is	   seriously	   lacking.	  
Laos’	   Ministry	   of	   Energy	   and	   Mines	   (MEM)	   does	   understand	   the	   need	   to	   prevent	  
environmental	   damage	   and	   to	   rehabilitate	   damaged	   areas,	   states	   the	   Bank	   (2006:	   19).	  
However,	   further	  observes	   the	   institution:	   ‘there	   are	   insufficient	   resources	   to	   implement	  
preventative	  or	   remedial	   action’	   (World	  Bank,	   2006:	  19).	  The	   same	   report	  by	   the	  World	  
Bank	  observes	  that	  the	  MEM	  management	  capacity	  has	  been	  inadequate	  for	  the	  demands	  
on	   its	   services:	   ‘Good	  managers	   are	   having	   to	   deal	  with	   environmental	   issues	   on	   an	   “ad	  
hoc”	   basis’	   (2006:	   19).	   In	   addition,	   MEM’s	   noted	   lack	   of	   expertise	   and	   experience	   in	  
environmental	  matters	  has	  been	  repeatedly	  emphasised.	  Such	  failure	  to	  adequately	  enforce	  
environmental	   standards	   appears	   to	   echo	   within	   the	   Social	   Impact	   Assessment	   (SIA):	  
‘specific	   work	   on	   SIA	   regulations	   and	   guidelines	   within	   the	   mining	   sector	   is	   at	   a	   very	  
preliminary	   stage’,	   notes	   a	   Report	   of	   the	  World	   Bank	  Group	   Fact-­‐Finding	  Mission	   in	   the	  
country	  (Boland,	  Kunanayagam	  and	  Walker,	  2001:	  iii).	  
A	  recent	  assessment	  of	  the	  government	  policy	  and	  regulatory	  capacity	  concludes	  that	  
while	  Laos	   ‘has	  began	   catching	  up	  with	   the	   fast	   expanding	  natural	   resources	   sector’	   […],	  
[t]his	   process	   is	   slow	   however,	   and	   means	   that	   there	   are	   still	   significant	   gaps	   in	   the	  
application	  of	  the	  laws	  as	  they	  stand’	  (CLC	  Asia,	  2009).	  The	  rapid	  expansion	  of	  the	  sector	  
has	  further	  challenged	  the	  government	  in	  other	  ways.	  A	  World	  Bank	  commissioned	  report	  
notes	   that	   since	   the	   country	   still	   remains	   geologically	  unmapped,	   there	   is	   a	   risk	   licences	  
being	   allocated	   ‘to	   operators	   who	   may	   be	   better	   qualified	   and	   equipped	   to	   understand	  
their	  worth’	  (2006:	  27)48.	  	  
When	   correlated	   to	   the	   dual	   role	   assigned	   to	   the	   mining-­‐related	   ministries,	   the	  
rampant	  corruption	  which	  particularly	  characterises	  the	  Philippines,	  PNG	  and	  Laos	  brings	  
to	  light	  the	  degree	  by	  which	  the	  social	  and	  environmental	  provisions	  of	  the	  mining	  regimes	  
are	   exposed	   to	   the	   whims	   of	   these	   countries’	   bureaucrats,	   notably	   at	   the	   local	   level.	  
According	   to	   Ang,	   the	   Philippines’	   chief	   issue	   indeed	   remains	   the	   towering	   levels	   of	  
corruption,	   albeit	   the	   World	   Bank	   tactfully	   refers	   to	   it	   as	   a	   problem	   of	   ‘governance’	  
(interview,	   2010).	   It	   is	   telling	   to	   note	   that	   while	   the	   Philippines	   ranks	   141	   out	   of	   180	  
countries	   on	   the	   Corruption	   Perceptions	   Index49	   of	   Transparency	   International	   (2009),	  
both	  Laos	  and	  PNG	  rank	  151.	  	  
If	   such	   widespread	   bureaucratic	   deficiencies	   have	   commonly	   been	   framed	   as	   mere	  
corruption	  issues,	  it	  is	  here	  argued	  that	  they	  should	  rather	  be	  perceived	  as	  symptoms	  of	  a	  
larger	  problem,	  one	  where	  multilateral	  standards	  are	  dictating	  a	  particular	  set	  of	  priorities	  
to	   the	   State.	   The	  World	   Bank	   indeed	   came	   to	   acknowledge	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   State,	  
albeit	   emphasising	   its	   role	   in	   the	   facilitation	   and	   regulation	   of	   the	   sector	   (World	   Bank,	  
                                                
48 Surprisingly, the same Report thus proceeds to list this shortage of geological data as a factor which makes Laos 
attractive to large-scale investors (2006: 40). 
49 The Index is a measurement tool of perceptions of public sector corruption. 
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2007).	  Key	  to	  this	  paper	  is	  the	  work	  of	  Campbell	  (2004;	  2009)	  who	  has	  shown	  that	  while	  
the	  regulatory	  and	  legal	  reforms	  in	  the	  mining	  sector	  in	  Africa	  have	  indeed	  contributed	  to	  a	  
more	  favourable	  environment	  for	  FDI,	  they	  have	  also	  entailed:	  ‘a	  process	  of	  redefining	  the	  
role	  of	  the	  State	  that	  is	  so	  profound	  that	  it	  has	  no	  historical	  precedent’	  (2004:	  7).	  Because	  
of	  this,	  further	  argued	  the	  author:	  ‘these	  measures	  have	  the	  potential	  effect	  in	  the	  countries	  
concerned	  of	  driving	  down	  norms	  and	  standards	   in	  areas	  of	   critical	   importance	   to	   social	  
and	  economic	  development,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  environment’	  (Campbell,	  2004:	  
7).	  	  
The	  case	  studies	  are	  here	  compelling.	  While	  the	  new	  regimes	  are	  quite	  solid	  in	  terms	  of	  
socio-­‐environmental	  standards,	  the	  very	  capacity	  of	  the	  State	  to	  carry	  out	  these	  provisions	  
remains	   hampered	   by	   decades	   of	   neoliberal	   reforms	   where	   the	   State’s	   functions	   were	  
transformed	   in	   a	   way	   that	   accentuates	   its	   ability	   to	   mediate,	   regulate	   and	   mobilise	   in	  
favour	   of	   the	   private	   sector	   rather	   than	   its	   citizens.	   Crucially,	   this	   is	   further	   telling	   of	  
another—complementary—strategic	   choice	   compelled	   upon	   the	   State;	   one	   where	   it	  
delegates	  to	  the	  industry	  its	  traditional	  monitoring	  and	  regulating	  tasks	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  
social	  welfare	  of	  the	  local	  communities.	  	  
b)	  The	  social-­development	  model	  &	  the	  management	  of	  local	  demands	  
	   Building	   on	   Campbell’s	   (2004;	   2009)	   conclusions,	   it	   is	   here	   argued	   that	   while	   the	  
latest	  generation	  of	  mining	  regimes	  tend	  to	  frame	  all	  mining	  activities	  under	  the	  umbrella	  
of	   poverty	   reduction,	   the	   socio-­‐economic	   and	   environmental	   impacts	   of	  mining	   on	   local	  
communities	   are	   in	   fact	   addressed	   within	   a	   particularly	   technical	   framework	   which	  
constricts	   the	   political	   spaces	   of	   stakeholders	   inclined	   to	   oppose	   mining	   activities.	   The	  
argument	  here	  is	  that	  the	  SDM	  represents	  an	  attempt	  to	  reduce	  investors’	  risks	  by	  offering	  
a	  depoliticised	  avenue	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  contain	  and	  manage	  opposition	  to	  mining	  activities.	  
While	   the	   State	   chose	   to	   ‘absent’	   itself	   from	   it’s	   formal	   regulatory	   and	   monitoring	  
responsibilities,	   the	   SDM	   further	   suggests	   a	   parallel	   transposition	   of	   a	   greater	   set	   of	  
environmental	  and	  social	  responsibilities	  to	  the	  industry.	  Such	  translation	  of	  course	  posits	  
a	   problem	   whereby	   the	   issues	   linked	   to	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   the	   activities	   on	   the	   ground	  
remain	  unresolved,	  thus	  ultimately	  running	  the	  risk	  to	  exacerbate	  investment	  risk.	  	  
In	   his	   analysis	   of	   the	  Peruvian	   case,	   Szablowski	   (2007)	   observed	   that	  while	   enticing	  
legal	  and	  economic	  provisions	  were	  being	  offered	   to	  mining	  companies	  as	   compensation	  
for	   investing	   in	  a	   risk	   country,	   the	  State	  was	   increasingly	  delegating	   its	   role	  as	   regulator	  
upon	   the	   shoulders	   of	   the	   industry.	   The	   author	   concludes	   that	   these	   legal	   and	   practical	  
conditions	  required	  to	  attract	  FDI	  have	  circumscribed	  the	  nation	  State’s	  ability	  to	  respond	  
to	  internal	  political	  pressures.	  As	  such,	  the	  State	  has	  developed	  coping	  strategies	  in	  order	  
to	   reconcile	   competing	   internal	   and	   external	   pressures.	   This	  means	   that	   it	   has	   formally	  
awarded	  rights	   to	   investors,	  while	   informally	  delegating	   local	   regulatory	   responsibilities:	  
‘Accordingly,	  it	  appears	  that	  states	  themselves	  are	  involved	  in	  transferring	  legal	  authority	  
to	  mineral	  enterprises	  to	  manage	  social	  mediation’	  (Szablowski,	  2007:	  27).	  The	  Bank	  does	  
observe	  that:	  
[…]	  the	  ‘shrinking	  state’	  has	  meant	  new	  responsibilities	  for	  private	  mining	  companies.	  
Other	   private	   sector	   actors	   have	   also	   taken	   prominent	   positions;	   that	   is,	   the	  
community	   members	   and	   representatives,	   including	   NGOs.	   In	   the	   area	   of	  
environmental	   and	   social	   responsiveness,	   the	   industry	   has	   moved	   from	   a	   phase	   of	  
awakening	   and	   acceptance	   to	   full	   integration	   of	   environmental	   considerations	   in	  
project	  preparation	  and	  operations.	  (World	  Bank,	  2007)	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It	   is	  however	   to	  be	  noted	   that	   the	  delegation	  strategy	   rests	  on	  a	   logic	  by	  which	   it	   is	   in	  a	  
company’s	  own	   interest	   to	  ensure	   local	  stability.	   In	   turn,	   the	   latter	  suggest	  a	   tendency	  to	  
frames	  socio-­‐environmental	  concerns	  linked	  to	  mining	  activities	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘externalities’,	  
rather	  than	  ‘risks’	  confronting	  local	  communities.	  In	  their	  analysis	  of	  the	  conceptualisation	  
of	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘risk’	  in	  the	  mining	  sector,	  Emel	  and	  Huber	  make	  a	  compelling	  argument	  by	  
questioning	   how	   capital	   has	   come	   to	   redefine	   the	   very	   idea	   of	   risk	   within	   such	   techno-­‐
managerial	  framework	  (2008:	  1397):	  	  
Largely	   ignored	   in	   the	   financial	   risk	   lexicon	   are	   the	   environmental,	   economic,	   social	  
and	   public	   health	   risks	   to	   the	   landowner	   whether	   it	   be	   the	   host	   state	   or	   the	   local	  
community.	   These	   latter	   risks—recognised	   as	   significant	   by	   local	   community	  
members,	  indigenous	  groups,	  and	  non-­‐governmental	  organisations	  that	  resist	  mines—
are	  viewed	  by	  investors,	  banks,	  and	  mining	  companies	  as	  engineering	  and	  social	  issues	  
that	  can	  be	  mitigated.	  The	  host	  government	  is	  pressured	  with	  discouraging	  significant	  
attention	   to	   these	   risks	   because	   they	   do	   heighten	   ‘political	   risk’	   and	   thus	   their	  
recognition	   will	   make	   the	   possibility	   of	   capital	   investment	   all	   the	   more	   precarious.	  
(Emel	  and	  Huber,	  2008:	  1398)	  
Crucially,	   this	   is	  a	  process	  where	  socio-­‐environmental	  principles	  are	  embraced	  only	  after	  
being	  re-­‐packaged	  within	  a	  depoliticised	  framework	  that	  serves	  to	  manage	  the	  risks	  facing	  
investors	  above	  all	  else.	  MIGA,	  the	  insurance	  arm	  of	  the	  WBG,	  observes	  that:	  	  
[…]	   well-­‐designed	   environmental	   and	   social	   programs	   can	   help	   manage	   potential	  
reputational	   risks	   for	   project	   sponsors,	   reduce	   social	   conflicts	   within	   communities,	  
protect	  the	  environment	  and	  help	  reduce	  political	  risks.	  For	  these	  reasons,	  MIGA	  aims	  
to	  help	  its	  clients	  take	  a	  responsible	  approach	  to	  the	  environmental	  and	  social	  aspects	  
of	  their	  projects.	  (Our	  emphasis.	  MIGA,	  2009b:	  1)	  
The	   shift	   to	   the	   SDM	   therefore	   allows	   for	   a	   contraction	   of	   local	   concerns	   within	   a	  
depoliticised	  framework,	  one	  that	  suggests	  technical	  solutions	  to	  problems	  which	  used	  to	  
be	   perceived	   as	   highly	   political.	   This	   echoes	   what	   Carroll	   (2010a)	   coined	   as	   ‘political	  
technologies’	  embedded	  within	  the	  larger	  context	  of	  a	  shift	  within	  neoliberalism50:	  
Specifically,	   these	   new	   technologies	   included	   participatory	   approaches	   and	  
consultation	   exercises	   designed	   to	   circumvent	   or	   dissolve	   implementation	  
impediments.	  The	  core	  concern	  underpinning	  much	  of	  this	  was	  not	  to	  have	  input	  from	  
newly	  empowered	  citizens	   in	  shaping	  the	  development	  and	  deployment	  of	  particular	  
programmes	  and	  projects	  […]	  Rather,	  the	  technologies	  were	  executed	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  
sought	   to	   build	   constituencies	   for	   particular	   agendas	   and	  marginalise	   opposition,	   in	  
tandem	  with	  technocratic	  efforts	  to	  avoid	  some	  of	  the	  problems	  attending	  past	  efforts–
especially	   environmental	   and	   social	   problems	   associated	   with	   large-­‐scale	  
infrastructure	  projects.	  (Carroll	  2010a:	  9)	  
This	  provides	  great	  insights	  within	  the	  WBG’s	  SDM	  which	  trickled	  down	  to	  mining	  regimes	  
throughout	   the	  Global	   South,	   and	   in	   this	   case	   to	   the	   Philippines	   and	  PNG,	  where	  mining	  
activities	  have	  historically	   been	  highly	   contentious	  politically.	   The	  political-­‐economy	  and	  
the	  environmental	   legacy	  of	   the	  sector	  have	   indeed	  repeatedly	  polarised	  public	  opinions,	  
notably	  in	  light	  of	  these	  countries	  rich	  and	  unique	  biodiversity.	  
In	  such	  light,	  recent	  imperatives	  for	  the	  participation	  of	  local	  populations,	  as	  well	  as	  for	  
new	  social	  and	  environmental	  provisions	  conveyed	  by	   the	  Bank,	  do	  not	   translate	  a	  novel	  
interest	   in	  the	  political	  empowerment	  of	   local	  entities.	  They	  rather	  encompass	  a	  pressing	  
                                                
50 There is a rich literature on the subject. See Carroll (2010b); Gamble (2006); Jayasuriya (2001); Robison (2006). 
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need	   to	   rally	  certain	  segments	  of	   civil	   society	   to	  manage	   local	   resistance	  and	   in	  so	  doing	  
reduce	   the	   risks	   faced	   by	   the	   industry.	   Here	   participatory	   schemes	   and	   civil	   society	  
engagement	  serve	  to	  mediate	  the	  negative	  impact	  of	  mining	  activities	  on	  the	  ground,	  while	  
also	  offering	  a	  depoliticised	  path	  to	  vent	  local	  contestation.	  	  
c)	  Conflict,	  politics	  &	  insurgency	  
	   While	   the	   industry	   and	   the	   State	   have	   embraced	   the	   SDM	   descending	   from	   the	  
multilateral	  arena,	  the	  imminent	  question	  remaining	  to	  be	  addressed	  is	  whether	  the	  latter	  
will	   indeed	   foster	   the	   long-­‐term	   local	   stability	   sought	  by	   the	  mining	   industry.	   In	   this	   last	  
section,	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  the	  process	  might	  rather	  be	  prone	  to	  exacerbate	  existing	  tensions	  
in	  the	  long-­‐term.	  In	  fact,	  the	  techno-­‐managerial	  settings	  used	  to	  frame	  local	  voices,	  coupled	  
with	  the	  re-­‐localisation	  process	  of	  the	  burden	  of	  implementation	  and	  monitoring	  onto	  the	  
local	   arena,	  may	   be	   an	   explosive	   cocktail	   for	   countries	   such	   as	   the	   Philippines	   and	  PNG,	  
where	  mining	  activities	  have	  already	  ignited	  entire	  regions.	  	  
As	  argued	  in	  the	  previous	  section	  of	  this	  contribution,	  the	  decentralisation	  process	  of	  
the	   State’s	   power	   in	   recent	   years	   has	   failed	   to	   be	   accompanied	   by	   greater	   financial	   and	  
human	   resources	   to	   the	   local	   governmental	   sphere,	   thus	   leaving	   a	   great	   gap	   in	   the	   local	  
monitoring	   capacities,	   a	   gap	   now	   partly	   filled	   by	   the	   industry.	   While	   the	   process	   is	  
convenient	  for	  a	  government	  that	  seeks	  to	  please	  pro-­‐mining	  interests	  without	  rattling	  its	  
own	   political	   constituency,	   it	   however	   creates	   a	   clear	   power	   imbalance	   where	   the	   local	  
communities	   are	   left	  negotiating	  with	  multinational	   industries.	  The	   ‘strategic	   absence’	   of	  
the	   State	   at	   the	   local	   level	   and	   the	   implied	   delegation	   of	   the	   enforcement	   of	   the	   socio-­‐
environmental	   standards	   to	   the	   companies	   have	   indeed	   left	   local	   communities	   in	   an	  
awkward	   rapport	   de	   force.	   Without	   the	   central	   State	   as	   an	   overseer,	   a	   range	   of	  
questionable	   tactics	  by	   some	   companies	  has	  been	  extensively	   reported,	   notably	  with	   the	  
support	  of	  easily	  corruptible	  local	  authorities.	  	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  FPIC	  in	  the	  Philippines51,	  the	  deception,	  cooptation	  and	  even	  coercion	  of	  
indigenous	   peoples	   has	   been	   repeatedly	   noted.	   According	   to	  Alano	   of	   a	  Mindanao	   based	  
NGO:	   ‘not	  only	  is	  FPIC	  the	  only	  place	  where	  the	  local	  communities	  are	  to	  have	  a	  say	  [in	  a	  
mining	   project],	   they	   sometimes	   don’t	   even	   have	   time	   to	   read	   the	   technical	   reports’	  
(interview,	  2010).	  Building	  on	   the	   case	  of	   the	  Midsalip	   community	  where	   tactics	   such	  as	  
using	   presence	   sheets	   for	   a	   mere	   information	   meeting	   were	   used	   by	   the	   geotechnical	  
company	  to	  ‘prove’	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  community	  for	  the	  project,	  Coupry	  (2007)	  concludes	  
that	   the	   FPIC	   must	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   ‘democratic	   farce52’.	   Whitmore	   (2006)	   further	   lists	   a	  
number	  of	  abuses	  of	  FPIC,	  including:	  
[…]	  Ignoring	  or	  misrepresenting	   ‘joint	  meetings’	  (Rio	  Tinto	  in	  Pagadian),	  the	  creation	  
of	   bogus	   community	   organisations	   (TVI	   in	   Canatuan),	   falsifying	   documents	   of	  
community	  assent	  (Crew/Mindex	  in	  Mindoro),	  asking	  communities	  to	  sign	  agreements	  
in	   languages	   they	   do	   not	   understand	   (WMC	   in	   Tampkan),	   the	   bribery	   of	   community	  
leaders	   (Climax	   in	   Didipio),	   and	   finally,	   intimidation	   of	   community	   leaders	   (TVI	   in	  
Canatuan	  again).	  (Whitmore,	  2006)	  
The	  transfer	  of	  the	  monitoring	  and	  enforcement	  of	  the	  socio-­‐environmental	  provisions	  to	  
the	   local	   spheres	   further	   leaves	   affected	   communities	  with	   the	   overwhelming	   burden	   of	  
having	   the	   knowledge	   of	   the	   law	   as	  well	   as	   collecting	   the	   data	   required	   for	   challenging	  
mining	   projects.	   Accessing	   such	   mining	   information	   has	   however	   proven	   to	   be	   quite	  
                                                
51 On the subject, see notably Coupry (2007); Goodland and Wicks (2009); Nettleton, Whitmore and Glennie 
(2004); Raymundo, Ramo and Corpuz (2005); Whitmore (2006). 
52 Author’s translation. 
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difficult	   notably	   in	   the	   Philippines,	   since	   the	   DENR,	   MGB	   and	   the	   Environmental	  
Management	  Bureau	  have	  been	  found	  to	  be	  ‘averse	  to	  disclosing	  information	  to	  the	  public’	  
(Aguilar,	  2008,	  quoted	  in	  O’Callaghan	  and	  Vivoda,	  2010:	  11-­‐12).	  	  
Additionally,	   it	   is	   compelling	   to	   note	   that	   the	   Environmental	   Impact	   Assessments,	  
which	  are	  required	  in	  the	  countries	  studied	  for	  this	  contribution,	  overwhelmingly	  rely	  on	  
the	   industry’s	   voluntary	   compliance.	   This	   faith	   in	   the	   industry’s	   self-­‐regulation	   is	   deeply	  
entrenched	   within	   the	   SDM.	   It	   is	   to	   be	   noted	   that	   the	   WBG’s	   own	   standards	  
overwhelmingly	  rely	  on	  industry-­‐generated	  information53.	  	  
However,	  beyond	  the	  reliance	  on	  an	  industry	  whose	  line	  of	  accountability	  is	  evidently	  
directed	  to	  its	  shareholders,	  the	  EIA	  process	  in	  the	  Philippines	  has	  been	  found	  to	  be	  lacking	  
in	  terms	  of	  enforcement.	  In	  the	  proposal	  for	  an	  Alternative	  Mining	  Bill	  (2009),	  the	  current	  
EIA	   is	   referred	   to	   as	   ‘outdated’	   and	   insufficient	   to	   ‘adequately	   address	   the	   complexity	   of	  
mine	  operations’54.	  A	  fact-­‐finding	  team	  led	  by	  Clare	  Short	  MP,	  the	  former	  UK	  Secretary	  of	  
State	   for	   Overseas	   Development,	   which	   visited	   the	   Philippines	   in	   2006,	   found	   that	   in	  
practice,	   the	   ‘participation	   rights,	   including	   the	   right	   to	   information,	   participation	   in	  
decision	  making	  and	  access	  to	   justice’	  required	  by	  the	  EIA	  was	  lacking	  (Doyle,	  Wicks	  and	  
Nally,	  2006:	  12).	  It	  further	  took	  note	  of	  local	  communities	  and	  NGOs	  complaints	  regarding	  
‘the	  difficulty	  communities	  had	  in	  obtaining	  copies	  of	  EIAs,	  and	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  independent	  
analysis	  or	  explanation	  of	  their	  contents	  and	  implications’	  (Doyle,	  Wicks	  and	  Nally,	  2006:	  
12).	  	  
In	   PNG,	   while	   community	   consultation	   has	   been	   part	   of	   the	   EIA	   process	   since	   the	  
1980s,	   the	   EIR	   has	   observed	   a	   clear	   need	   to	   ensure	   that	   all	   aspects	   of	   society	   were	  
represented	  in	  discussions:	   ‘There	  needs	  to	  be	  transparency	  of	  information	  and	  more	  use	  
of	   local	   resources	   and	   expertise	   in	   working	   on	   solving	   the	   problems.	   Most	   importantly,	  
much	  more	  time	  is	  needed	  to	  review,	  research,	  discuss	  and	  decide	  upon	  the	  issues,	  making	  
sure	  all	  stakeholders	  are	  adequately	  represented	  (EIR,	  2003a:	  x).	  
In	   Laos,	   despite	   the	   early	   involvement	   of	   the	   IFC	   in	   the	   initial	   development	   of	   the	  
Sepon	  Gold	  mine	   project55	   in	   2002,	   similar	   trends	   to	   the	   ones	   observed	   in	   PNG	   and	   the	  
Philippines	   are	   emerging.	   While	   Oxiana	   later	   found	   its	   own	   financing,	   it	   had	   initially	  
requested	   the	   IFC	   involvement	   in	   the	   project.	   While	   there	   is	   no	   doubt	   that	   IFC’s	  
involvement	  brought	  greater	  attention	  onto	  environmental	  and	  social	  assessments	  needed	  
for	  a	  project	  classified	  as	  ‘Category	  A’	  (i.e.	  it	  is	  expected	  to	  have	  adverse	  impacts	  that	  may	  
be	  sensitive,	   irreversible,	  and	  diverse)56,	   the	  process	  was	  reported	  by	  the	  EIR	  as	  strongly	  
criticised	  by	  NGOs.	  The	  organisation	  Aid	  Watch	  argued	  that	   the	  overall	  process	  had	  been	  
very	   limited,	   if	   not	   somewhat	   superficial,	   with	   ‘a	   serious	   number	   of	   anomalies	   and	  
shortcomings’	  in	  the	  application	  of	  the	  ESIA	  (EIR,	  2003a:	  31):	  ‘In	  many	  cases	  there	  has	  not	  
been	   sufficient	   in-­‐depth	   study	   and	   analysis,	   and	   mitigation	   planning	   often	   has	   been	  
superficial,	  alluding	  to	  further	  studies	  and	  further	  elaboration	  of	  details	  later’	  (Aid	  Watch,	  
                                                
53 The IFC’s own Social and Environmental Assessment (SEA) is to be written by the client and as such, the client 
has a substantial influence on the range of issues that will later be assessed by the Institution. It is to be further noted 
that the SEA does not specifically require human rights issues to be addressed, nor guarantees the opportunity for 
local communities to review a project’s Action Plan before it is finalised (Halifax Initiative Coalition, 2006). 
54 Filed in Congress in May 2009, House Bill No. 6342 proposes to scrap the Mining Act of 1995 and to introduce a 
new mining policy. See Alyansa Tigil Mina (2009). 
55 The Sepon mine, which was originally owned by the Australian company Oxiana Resources (with a 20 per cent 
interest from Rio Tinto), started gold production in January 2003. The Minerals and Metals Group (MMG) now own 
the Sepon Gold and Copper Mines. 
56 The non-profit group Friends of the Earth notes that the Oxiana copper mine, which relies on cyanide heap 
leaching, is expected to produce 36 million tons of waste with potentially catastrophic consequences, notably for the 
Nam Kok River, a tributary of the Mekong with high aquatic biodiversity (Friends of the Earth, n.a.). 
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quoted	  in	  EIR,	  2003a:	  31).	  The	  EIR	  concludes:	  
Involvement	  of	  the	  public	  and	  NGOs	  working	  in	  the	  area	  has	  been	  very	  weak,	  and	  even	  
the	  government	  itself	   is	  not	  well	   informed	  regarding	  potential	  consequences	  of	  many	  
social	  and	  environmental	  impacts.	  […]	  The	  IFC	  should	  have	  exercised	  their	  influence	  to	  
ensure	  that	  all	  details	  regarding	  economic,	  environmental	  and	  social	  conditions	  were	  
fully	  addressed.	  (EIR,	  2003a:	  31)	  
In	   a	   way	   that	   strongly	   resonated	   with	   the	   other	   cases	   presented	   in	   this	   paper,	   the	  
participatory	   process	   in	   this	   project	   in	   Laos,	   which	   was	   advertised	   as	   a	   direct	   positive	  
contribution	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  IFC,	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  rather	  limited	  to	  an	  ‘information’	  
process.	   The	   EIR	   further	   concludes:	   ‘One	   limitation	   of	   the	   ESIA	   was	   the	   consultation	  
process	   of	   Oxiana,	   which	   mainly	   consisted	   of	   providing	   information	   and	   not	   having	  
discussions	  (EIR,	  2003a:	  31).	  	  
Lastly,	   there	   further	   exists	   a	  particularly	   acute	  problem	   inherent	   to	   fostering	  mining	  
activities	  in	  regions	  where	  heightened	  local	  tensions	  already	  exist.	  The	  EIR	  observed	  that	  
‘extractive	   industries	  have	  been	   linked	  to	  human	  rights	  abuses	  and	  civil	  conflict’	   (2003b:	  
6),	  something	  that	  is	  particularly	  apparent	  in	  the	  Philippines	  and	  PNG.	  If	  the	  SDM	  attempts	  
to	   channel	   voices	   of	   contestation,	   the	   depoliticised	   avenues	   offered	   might	   prove	   to	   be	  
inadequate	   to	   address	   the	   rampant	   insecurity	   notably	   already	   plaguing	   several	   of	   the	  
Philippines’s	   mining	   regions.	   Here	   the	   expansion	   of	   large-­‐scale	   mining	   has	   ventured	   on	  
territories	   already	   the	   subject	   of	   armed	   resistance	   to	   the	   government,	   notably	   in	   the	  
Mindanao	  region.	  This	  process	  has	  further	  led	  to	  an	  increased	  militarisation	  to	  bolster	  the	  
security	  of	  mining	  projects.	  Crucially,	   the	  country	  has	  witnessed	  a	  rise	   in	   the	  presence	  of	  
private	  military	   companies	  which	   have	   led	   to	   rampant	   human	   rights	   abuses.	  With	  more	  
than	  700	  activists	  killed	   in	   less	   than	   five	  years—including	  civil	   rights	  and	  environmental	  
advocates—the	  Philippines	   is	   currently	   facing	  what	  Doyle,	  Wicks	  and	  Nally	   refer	   to	  as	   ‘a	  
crisis	  of	  extra-­‐judicial	  killings’	  (2006:	  iii).	  	  
In	  PNG,	  where	   the	  population	   is	   almost	  100	  per	   cent	   indigenous	   and	  divided	   in	  800	  
different	  local	  tribes	  (Koma,	  2005:	  165),	  the	  EIR	  observed	  heightened	  local	  tensions	  linked	  
to	   the	   fast	   development	   of	   mining	   activities:	   ‘[T]here	   have	   been	   a	   lot	   of	   disputes	   over	  
mining,	  including	  a	  civil	  war	  at	  one	  point	  (EIR,	  2003a:	  x).	  The	  copper	  mine	  in	  Bougainville	  
was	  indeed	  closed	  in	  1989	  following	  an	  uprising	  by	  local	  communities	  and	  an	  ensuing	  civil	  
war	  within	  the	  region.	  Today,	  one	  of	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  Bank’s	  Technical	  Assistance	  loan	  
to	   the	   country	   (2008)	   is	   dedicated	   to	   assisting	   the	   newly	   recognised	   autonomous	  
government	   in	   its	  attempt	  to	  re-­‐open	  the	  region	  to	  mineral	  exploration	  and	  development	  
(World	  Bank,	  2009).	  
There	   ultimately	   exists	   some	   degree	   of	   concern	   as	   the	   fundamental	   role	   played	   by	  
public	  organisations	  in	  not	  only	  investing	  directly	  in	  for-­‐profit	  projects,	  as	  it	  is	  the	  case	  for	  
the	  IFC,	  but	  in	  highly	  sensitive	  environment	  as	  well.	  In	  light	  of	  the	  clear	  conclusions	  of	  the	  
EIR	   that	   the	   WBG	   should	   refrain	   from	   investing	   in	   mining	   projects	   in	   conflict-­‐affected	  
countries	  (EIR,	  2003:	  47),	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	  question	  the	  catalytic	  role	  of	  the	  WBG	  in	  fostering	  
investments	  in	  specifically	  high-­‐risk	  environment.	  As	  argued	  by	  the	  Group:	  Our	  presence	  
in	  a	  potential	  investment	  can	  literally	  transform	  a	  ‘no-­‐go’	  into	  a	  ‘go’	  (MIGA,	  2009a).	  
	  
Conclusion	  
	   This	   paper	   followed	   the	   World	   Bank	   Group	   in	   its	   attempt	   to	   foster	   mining	  
investments	   in	   Asia’s	   mining	   sector.	   While	   the	   catalysing	   role	   played	   by	   the	   public	  
organisation	   in	   such	   a	   high-­‐risk	   area	   has	   been	   framed	   under	   the	   umbrella	   of	   pro-­‐poor	  
growth	   and	   solid	   socio-­‐environmental	   safeguards,	   it	   was	   argued	   in	   this	   paper	   that	   the	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involvement	  of	  the	  Group	  in	  the	  sector	  should	  rather	  be	  read	  as	  intrinsically	  political.	  
Building	   on	   the	   cases	   of	   the	   Philippines,	   PNG	   and	   Laos,	   this	   paper	   looked	   at	   the	  
fundamental	   role	   played	   by	   the	  WBG	   in	   assisting	   these	   countries	   to	   adopt/reform	   their	  
mining	   regimes	   in	  order	   to	   entice	   foreign	   investments	   in	   their	   large-­‐scale	  mining	   sector.	  
While	   highly	   successful	   in	   stimulating	   foreign	   direct	   investments	   in	   the	   sector,	   these	  
regimes	  are	  also	  proving	  to	  be	  problematic	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  new	  roles	  and	  
responsibilities	   it	   assigns	   to	   mining	   stakeholders.	   This	   is	   to	   say	   that	   the	   Social-­‐
Development	   Model	   rooted	   at	   the	   core	   of	   the	   regimes	   promoted	   by	   the	   Bank	   has	   been	  
shifting	   the	   role	   of	   the	   state	   in	   a	  way	   that	   the	   latter	   is	   increasingly—and	   strategically—
absenting	  itself	  from	  its	  monitoring	  and	  regulating	  functions,	  leaving	  the	  industry	  and	  local	  
communities	   to	   negotiate	   the	   promises	   of	   the	   social-­‐development	   narrative	   attached	   to	  
such	  activities.	  	  
Crucially,	   the	  engineering	  of	  mining	  regimes	  and	  norm-­‐settings	  in	  multilateral	  arenas	  
brings	   forth	   concerns	   relating	   to	   the	   legitimacy	  of	   the	   transformations	  of	   such	   roles	   and	  
responsibilities	  assigned	  to	   local	  mining	  stakeholders,	  as	  well	  as	   the	  possible	  subsequent	  
contraction	   of	   local	   political	   spaces.	   However,	   in	   the	   long	   run,	   such	   contractions	   might	  
prove	   to	   be	   seriously	   hindering	   the	   very	   objective	   of	   the	  WBG’s	   presence	   in	   the	   sector,	  
which	  is	  to	  tackle	  the	  newly	  acknowledge	  political	  risk	  attached	  to	  mining	  investments.	  The	  
recent	  African	  wave	  of	  reversal	  of	  the	  very	  mining	  codes	  promoted	  by	  the	  WBG	  in	  the	  last	  
decade	  on	  the	  continent	  may	  here	  serve	  as	  a	  warning	  to	  the	  Group’s	  strategy	  in	  Asia.	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